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“The United States Constitution is about power and 
liberty. The South African Constitution is about equality 
and reconciliation.” 
 
 -- Justice Sachs, South African Constitutional Court 
(1994-2009) 
 
[M]en suppose it requires no special wisdom to know 
what is just and unjust, because it is not difficult to 
understand the things about which the law pronounces . 
. . How an action must be performed, how a distribution 
must be made to be a just action or just distribution – to 
know this is a harder task than to know what medical 
treatment will produce health. 
-- Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book V.ix.15.1 
 
“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use 
without just compensation.”  
-- U.S. CONST. amend. V.  
 
(1) [N]o law may permit arbitrary deprivation of 
property.  
(2) Property may be expropriated only in terms of law of 
general application— (a) for a public purpose or in the 
public interest; and (b) subject to compensation . . . 
(3) The amount of the compensation and the time and 
manner of payment must be just and equitable, reflecting 
an equitable balance between the public interest and the 
interests of those affected, having regard to all relevant 
circumstances . . . .” 
 
-- S. AFR. CONST. Act 108 of 1996 Section 25 
I.      INTRODUCTION: GOING TOO FAR? 
Oliver Wendell Holmes, writing for the Court in Pennsylvania 
Coal Co. v. Mahon (1922), started the regulatory takings tradition in the 
U.S. with his famous line that “if regulation goes too far it will be 
recognized as a taking” deserving of just compensation. As this paper 
                                                 
1 ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 311 (H. Rackham trans., 2nd ed. 1934).  
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will show, how far is too far depends on where you are. Under the Fifth 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, regulations do not need to go as 
far as they once did, and under the law in states like Oregon and Florida, 
regulations do not need to go very far at all before one is entitled to 
compensation. Across the ocean in South Africa, the same regulation 
that went too far in Mahon would not constitute a taking at all under the 
South African Constitution’s main property provision, Section 25, or at 
least not an expropriation that required compensation. Under South 
Africa’s Constitution, it is very difficult for regulations to go too far, 
and South Africa’s dominant political party, the African National 
Congress (ANC), has mooted the idea that Section 25 has stood in the 
way of it going far enough to effect transformation.2 
 Contrasts between the U.S. and South Africa’s property rights 
regimes are readily apparent on the face of the respective property 
provisions. First, unlike in the U.S., South Africa did not need to wait 
so long after the passing of its final Constitution for the Courts to settle 
the questions of whether the state could expropriate property for public 
purposes or in the public interest.3 Section 25 of South Africa’s 
Constitution explicitly authorizes expropriations for “public purposes” 
or in the “public interest.”4 From the outset of its new constitutional 
dispensation, this arguably provided South Africa more leeway to effect 
land reform and socio-economic change than was allowed under 
existing U.S. constitutional law. Secondly, South Africa distinguishes 
between deprivations, which do not require compensation as a remedy 
and expropriations, which do require compensation. This has the 
potential to undermine any claim for the development of the doctrine of 
regulatory taking or constructive expropriation, again freeing up South 
Africa to regulate property without fear of incurring liability to affected 
property holders. Finally, while the U.S. Fifth Amendment requires just 
compensation, which has generally been interpreted to require market 
value compensation,5 South Africa’s Constitution requires just and 
                                                 
2 AJ VAN DER WALT, PROPERTY AND CONSTITUTION 8 (2012), 
http://www.pulp.up.ac.za/pdf/2012_10/2012_10.pdf (citing the ANC policy document, The second 
transition: Building a national democratic society and the balance of forces in 2012). 
3 Kelo v. New London, 545 U.S. 469, 472, 477, 480 (2005) (holding that the Fifth Amendment does not 
require literal public use, but the “broader and more natural interpretation of public use as ‘public purpose.’” 
A state may transfer property from one private party to another if future “use by the public” is the purpose 
of the taking). As Erwin Chemerinsky points out in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES (5th 
ed. 2015), this rule was well-established by Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954) and Hawaii Housing 
Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984). 
4 S. AFR. CONST., 1996; Section 28 of the Interim Constitution provided more limited scope than the Final 
Constitution, but it still provided that “such expropriation shall be permissible for public purposes only.” S. 
AFR. (INTERIM) CONST., 1993. 
5 See Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2431-32 (2015) (“The clear and administrable rule is that 
“just compensation normally is to be measured by ‘the market value of the property at the time of the 
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equitable compensation based on a whole host of factors in addition to 
market value. This also gives South Africa more leeway to affect land 
reform and to address the legacy of apartheid property law and policy. 
For most of the twenty-plus years since the drafting of the Final 
Constitution, the South African government, be it the legislature or the 
Courts, has not taken full advantage of this leeway to affect the 
transformation of the South African property regime.6 However, there 
have been a number of important transformative shifts, both in terms of 
South African legislation7 and case law,8 that are not only making use 
of the leeway that is apparent on the face of Section 25, but are pushing 
towards the limits of those provisions. This has led some people, in 
particular Dr. Anthea Jeffrey, Head of Policy Research at the Institute 
for Race Relations, to argue that this is opening up South Africa for 
Zimbabwe-style land grabs, regulatory takings without any 
compensation, and expropriations with below market compensation.9 
Business interests have echoed these concerns.10  
Meanwhile in the U.S., a number of states have pushed back 
against the Supreme Court’s decision to allow for the taking of private 
property for public purposes by enacting legislation that limits state-
based takings to those done for public use, or for a more limited range 
of public purposes.11 States have also reacted to what they consider to 
                                                 
taking.’”) (quoting United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24, 29, 105 S. Ct. 451, 83 L. Ed. 2d 376 
(1984)). 
6 See, e.g., VAN DER WALT, supra note 2, at 8-9, 12-13. (van der Walt focuses on the need for policy and 
legislative reform and not merely common law reform); Pierre de Vos, Willing Buyer, Willing Seller Works 
If you Have a Lifetime to Wait (June 13, 2013), http://constitutionallyspeaking.co.za/WILLING-BUYER-
WILLING-SELLER-WORKS-IF-YOU-HAVE-A-LIFETIME-TO-WAIT/.  
7 For instance, the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act, 28 of 2002, the recent Department 
of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Draft Preservation and Development of Agricultural Land Framework 
Bill, 2015, Notice 210, No 38545, 60 (GG).  
8 Agri South Africa v. Minister for Minerals and Energy 2013 4 SA 1 (CC) [hereinafter Agri SA]. 
9 Dr. Anthea Jeffrey, South Africa has taken a big step towards abolishing property rights, RAND DAILY 
MAIL (May 27, 2016), http://www.rdm.co.za/politics/2016/03/11/sa-has-taken-a-big-step-towards-
abolishing-property-rights; see also Dr. Anthea Jeffrey, LETTER: Expropriation Bill analysis flawed 
BUSINESS DAY (Mar. 01, 2016); and see Dr. Anthea Jeffrey,  Zuma’s land grab urgings to traditional chiefs; 
desperate move by a declining force, THOUGHT LEADERS (Mar. 17, 2015), 
http://www.biznews.com/thought-leaders/2015/03/17/zumas-land-grab-urgings-to-traditional-chiefs-a-
desperate-move-by-a-declining-force/. 
10 See South Africa: In Need of an Opposition, THE ECONOMIST 32 (June 18-24, 2016). 
11 Dana Berliner, Looking Back Ten Years After Kelo, 125 YALE L.J. F. 82 (2015), 
http://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/looking-back-ten-years-after-kelo (“In response to Kelo, a total of 
forty-four states changed their laws: Eleven changed their constitutions, while forty enacted a broad range 
of statutory changes.”). Note that while on one level the response was to protect private property from 
government regulation, on a deeper level much of the response was to protect poorer property owners from 
richer property owners who were using the state to expropriate property for their own private interest. For 
instance, legislative changes in Florida included: (1) creation of restrictions forbidding the transfer of 
condemned property to a private party within 10 years of the property’s condemnation; (2) prohibitions on 
the use of eminent domain to either abate or eliminate a public nuisance, or to prevent or eliminate slum or 
blight conditions; and (3) an amendment to state’s constitution that prohibits the transfer of condemned 
property to private parties absent a three-fifths majority vote of both legislative houses. In direct response 
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be a too stingy approach to regulatory takings and have passed 
legislation to provide compensation for regulatory takings that fall short 
of the requirements set by the Supreme Court.12 Finally, decisions by 
the Roberts Court over the last half-decade have expanded the 
protection of private property and further limited the ability of the 
government to regulate for the common good.13 
The upshot is that, while the trend in the U.S. has been to further 
limit the power of government to interfere with individual liberty and 
property rights, the trend in South Africa is to expand governmental 
power to affect a more egalitarian property regime. This gives substance 
to the claim by Justice Sachs above.14  The starkness of this contrast 
might in fact be overblown. There has always been a counter-current of 
a strong regulatory state in the U.S., and a very strong conservative 
property rights current in South Africa. The former has reigned in the 
unbridled use of private property in the U.S., while the latter has 
significantly dampened the wave and effects of property rights reform 
in the Constitution and subsequent legislation.    
Part II of this paper begins with a brief description of the 
political and economic context in which South Africa’s Section 25 
Property rights provision was drafted. It then moves on to provide a brief 
overview of Section 25, including the distinction between deprivations 
and expropriations as well as provisions calling for land reform. The 
paper then turns to case law evaluating the relationship between 
deprivations and expropriations and the negative impact of these 
decisions on the possibility of developing a doctrine of constructive 
expropriations, regulatory takings, and the possibility of providing 
compensations for deprivations that fall short of expropriations. Next, 
the paper addresses recent Constitutional Court decisions that interpret 
the term “expropriation” narrowly to require that the state acquire the 
                                                 
to the facts of Kelo, FLA. STAT. §73.014 forbids takings for the purpose of eliminating nuisances, slums, or 
blight.  
12 See text accompanying notes 179-247 below. 
13 For instance, Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 560 U.S. 702 (2010); 
Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586 (2013); and Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 135 S. 
Ct. 2419 (2015). 
14 James E. Krier and Stewart E. Sterk, An Empirical Study of Implicit Takings, 58 WILLIAM & MARY L. 
REV 35, 40 (2016). As James E. Krier and Stewart E. Sterk argue in their article, this depiction of the 
American model is perhaps overblown. Based on an empirical study of over 2,000 implicit takings cases in 
the U.S. from 1979 to 2012, they argue that the cases reflect a balance between the competing interests of 
“strong property rights on the one hand, and to the imperatives of an activist government on the other.” Id. 
at 40. They argue that, “American history is marked throughout by an ongoing tension between the rights 
of private property owners and the rights of the public to govern property for the sake of a sound social 
order.” Id. at 83 (citing the work of Gregory S. Alexander, COMMODITY AND PROPERTY: COMPETING 
VISIONS OF PROPERTY IN AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT, 1776-1970 (1997) and William J. Novak, The Myth 
of the “Weak” American State, 113 AM. HIST. REV. 752, 758 (2008)). See also WILLIAM NOVAK, THE 
PEOPLE’S WELFARE: LAW AND REGULATION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (1996).  
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property or property right in question, while at the same time embracing 
the concept of state custodianship over property. The paper then 
evaluates recent legislation that capitalizes on the notion of 
custodianship, which significantly broadens the power of the state to 
affect land reform without incurring liability to pay compensation. Part 
II of the paper will address how compensation should be determined in 
cases where an expropriation has occurred.  
Part III of this paper addresses the U.S. approach to takings, 
particularly regulatory takings. After noting the Supreme Court’s 
approach to takings in the infamous case of Kelo v. City of New London 
and the state law response, the paper turns to regulatory takings pre-
Roberts Court. This is contrasted with recent Roberts Court cases 
expanding protection for property rights by expanding the doctrine of 
regulatory takings, and in the most recent case of Horne v. Department 
of Agriculture, expanding the doctrine of physical takings into what is 
arguably the regulatory takings realm. The paper will then critically 
evaluate the failure of the Court in Horne to remand on the question of 
just compensation and the decision to award unanalyzed market value 
compensation. The paper then turns to a critical evaluation of state based 
legislative expansions of the doctrine of regulatory takings with an 
emphasis on the approaches taking in Oregon and Florida. This section 
concludes by briefly addressing a recent Florida case that is pending 
before the Supreme Court of Florida which could expand government 
liability for the impact of regulations on the value of property well 
beyond its present scope in Florida. 
The paper concludes by summarizing the contrast between the 
expansive protection of private property in the U.S. and the remedies 
provided therein to the expansive room for the government in South 
Africa to regulate private property and effect land reform with the 
limited scope for compensation therein. As noted above, this stark 
contrast on the face of the law has not translated into the same sharp 
contrast in the application of the law.  
II.      SOUTH AFRICA: REMEDIES FOR DEPRIVATIONS, 
EXPROPRIATIONS AND CUSTODIANSHIP? 
The Constitutional protection of property rights in South Africa 
reflects a negotiated compromise between forces seeking to redress the 
racist and grossly unequal distribution of property that resulted from 
apartheid, and those forces that wanted to enshrine the protection of 
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property in a justiciable Bill of Rights.15 Parliamentary supremacy ruled 
during the apartheid era and ensured that the majority of South Africans, 
be they black, colored (mixed race), or of Asian descent, often could not 
buy, own, or sell what, in the civil tradition, is called immovable 
property, or what, in the U.S., we would call real estate.16 The forces 
seeking redress and redistribution included the African National 
Congress (ANC) among others, and those seeking protection for 
existing property rights included the apartheid National Party, or New 
National Party as they came to be known after the formal ending of 
apartheid, and the Democratic Party, or Democratic Alliance as it came 
to be known.17 Those arguing for the constitutional protection of 
property rights argued that this was necessary for investment, social and 
economic growth and for personal security, while those arguing for 
change and reform focused on the importance of land law to the 
apartheid system and therefore the need to directly address this area of 
the law in order to “address the legacy of poverty and marginalization 
caused by apartheid.”18 As AJ van der Walt notes, the issue was so 
contentious that the property clause was one of the last provisions of the 
1993 interim Constitution to be drafted.19 This negotiated compromise 
was reflected in Section 28 of the interim Constitution (Act 200 of 1993) 
and then finally in Section 25 of the Final Constitution (Act 108 of 
1996). 
Although the term “property” is not clearly defined in the 
Constitution, Section 25 provides that “property is not limited to land.”20 
In the Roman Dutch tradition, which forms the basis for South African 
property law, otherwise known as “the law of things,” property rights 
are rights in things, both corporeal and incorporeal (e.g., rights to shares 
in a company).21  
Section 25 addresses both arbitrary deprivations and 
expropriations of property. The remedy for the former, at least at 
                                                 
15 See, e.g., Mathew Chaskalson and Carole Lewis, Property, in MATHEW CHASKALSON EDS 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF SOUTH AFRICA, 31.1 (1998). 
16 See the Native Land Act 27 of 1913, Development Trust and Land Act 18 of 1936, the Group Areas Acts 
41 of 1950, 77 of 1957, and 36 of 1966. Note that these laws and others during the apartheid era created 
these classifications. These Acts were all repealed by the Abolition of Racially Based Land Measures Act 
108 of 1991. 
17 Chaskalson and Lewis, supra note 15, at 31.1.  
18 VAN DER WALT, supra note 2, at 3. The academic debate on this issue is lengthy and can be found in 
footnote 2 of his work. AJ van der Walt, who is a progressive, shifted from being anti-property clause to 
pro-property clause once he was convinced that it could be used to serve constitutional reform rather than 
obstruct them. Id.  
19 Id. at 3 n.3. 
20 S. AFR. CONST., 1996 § 25(4)(b). 
21 E.J. Marias, When Does State Interference with Property (Now) Amount to Expropriation? An Analysis 
of the Agri SA Court’s State Acquisition Requirement (Part I) PER/PELJ 2015 (18); see also VAN DER WALT, 
supra note 2. 
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present, is simply a declaration of invalidity of the law in question,22 
while the remedy provided for the latter, expropriations, is considerably 
more complicated. Unlike in the U.S., where the remedy is generally the 
market value of the property at the time of the expropriation, South 
Africa’s Constitution requires an amount, time and manner of 
compensation that is just and equitable. Of course one might argue that 
this should be the same thing as the market value, but Section 25(3) of 
the Constitution envisions something quite different. Under subsection 
3, this must reflect an “equitable balance between the public interest and 
those affected, having regard to all relevant circumstances,” including:  
 
a. the current use of the property; 
b. the history of the acquisition and use of the property; 
c. the market value of the property; 
d. the extent of direct state investment and subsidy in the 
acquisition and beneficial capital improvement of the 
property; and 
e. the purpose of the expropriation.23 
 
Subsection 4 further provides that the public interest within this 
balance includes “the nation's commitment to land reform, and to 
reforms to bring about equitable access to all South Africa's natural 
resources.”24 
The remaining subsections of Section 25 explicitly contemplate 
legislation that may constitute deprivations and expropriations of rights 
for the purposes of proving equitable access to lands,25 and to achieve 
land and water reform as a means to redress past racial discrimination.26  
Subsection 7 provides the authority for parliament to pass an Act 
providing the remedy of restitution or equitable redress for persons and 
                                                 
22 Although Roux has argued that the court could provide an “appropriate” remedy under its section 38 
powers, thus far the only remedy provided for violations of Section 25(1) deprivations has been to declare 
the law invalid. Theunis Roux, The ‘Arbitrary Deprivation’ Vortex: Constitutional Property Law After FNB, 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVERSATIONS 265, 277-78 (2009). As noted by Krier and Sterk, the federal rule in the 
U.S. prior to 1987 was to provide declaratory or injunctive relief for regulatory or implicit takings. Krier & 
Sterk, supra note 14, at n.49. Some state courts had provided compensation for regulatory takings since 
1981, following the view of Justice Brennan in his dissent in San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. San Diego, 450 
U.S. 621, 637-60 (1981). Krier and Sterk, supra note 14, at n.66. 
23 S. AFR. CONST., 1996 § 25(3)(a)-(e). 
24 S. AFR. CONST., 1996 § 25(4). 
25 S. AFR. CONST., 1996 (Subsection 5 requires that the state “take reasonable legislative and other measures, 
within its available resources, to foster conditions which enable citizens to gain access to land on an 
equitable basis.”).  
26 S. AFR. CONST., 1996 (Subsection 8 further stipulates that “No provision of this section may impede the 
state from taking legislative and other measures to achieve land, water and related reform, in order to redress 
the results of past racial discrimination, provided that any departure from the provisions of this section is in 
accordance with the provisions of section 36(1)” (the general limitations of rights provision)). 
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communities who were dispossessed of their property after June 19, 
1913 “as a result of past racially discriminatory laws or practices.”27 
Finally, Subsection 9 requires Parliament to pass an Act providing 
“security of tenure or comparable redress” for “person[s] or 
communit[ies] whose tenure of land is legally insecure as a result of past 
racially discriminatory laws or practices [are] entitled, to the extent 
provided by an Act of Parliament, either to tenure which is legally 
secure or to comparable redress.”28 
As noted, Section 25 distinguishes between deprivations in 
25(1) and expropriations in 25(2).29  The text of Section 25(1) only 
requires that deprivations be non-arbitrary and that they result from a 
law of general application. As the text of 25(1) states, “No one may be 
deprived of property except in terms of law of general application, and 
no law may permit arbitrary deprivation of property.”30 Most 
regulations impacting one’s property or property rights would fall under 
Section 25(1) and thus, there would be no effective remedy for the 
deprivation.31 Under this provision there is no stated requirement for 
compensation and thus, the only remedy available is for arbitrary 
deprivations and that remedy is to invalidate the law in question.32 There 
would in fact be no remedy for deprivations that were not arbitrary 
unless they rose to the level of an expropriation under Section 25(2). 
However, as we will see, some expropriations may never make it past 
                                                 
27 S. AFR. CONST., 1996 § 25(7). 
28 S. AFR. CONST., 1996 § § 25(6), (9). 
29 The Constitutional Court in Harksen v. Lane NO and Others, [1997] ZACC 12; 1998 (1) SA 300 (CC); 
1997 (11) BCLR 1489 (CC) at para. 33 noted that “The distinction between expropriation (or compulsory 
acquisition as it is called in some other foreign jurisdictions) which involves acquisition of rights in property 
by a public authority for a public purpose and the deprivation of rights in property which fall short of 
compulsory acquisition has long been recognised in our law.”  
30 This language is reminiscent of the words of Justice McKenna in the pre-Moran Supreme Court case of 
Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915), concerning an ordinance by the expanding city of Los 
Angeles forbidding the use of the petitioner’s land for making bricks from the clay on his property (land 
that he purchased for that purpose before the ordinance was passed and the city extended to his property). 
When speaking of the police power to regulate Justice McKenna stated: 
It is to be remembered that we are dealing with one of the most essential powers of 
government -- one that is the least limitable. It may, indeed, seem harsh in its exercise, 
usually is on some individual, but the imperative necessity for its existence precludes 
any limitation upon it when not exerted arbitrarily. A vested interest cannot be 
asserted against it because of conditions once obtaining. To so hold would preclude 
development, and fix a city forever in its primitive conditions. There must be 
progress, and if, in its march, private interests are in the way, they must yield to the 
good of the community.  
Id. at 410. 
31 E.J. Marias notes that deprivations are “sourced in the state’s regulatory police power” and usually effects 
large groups of people in society more or less equally. For these reasons deprivations are normally not 
compensated. Marias, supra note 21, at 2983. 
32 van Der Walt notes that while invalidity would be the usual remedy for regulatory excess leading to an 
arbitrary deprivation, that excess could also be scaled down through regulatory or administrative 
compensation.  VAN DER WALT, supra note 2, at 146 n.101.  In other words, compensation may alleviate an 
otherwise arbitrary deprivation.  Roux, supra note 22, at 277 (2009). 
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Section 25(1) to Section 25(2).  
A.  Arbitrary Deprivations: Room for Regulatory Takings 
Doctrine? 
The test for what constitutes an arbitrary deprivation was set out 
at length in the 2002 Constitutional Court decision of First National 
Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v.  Commissioner,  South  African Revenue 
Service & Another (FNB).33 The plaintiff in FNB challenged Section 
114 of the Customs and Excise Act because it authorized the 
Commissioner of the Revenue Service to detain and sell property in 
possession or control of a customs debtor even in cases where the 
property was owned by a third party, e.g., in this case, FNB.34 While 
FNB argued that this was an uncompensated expropriation of property, 
the Court held that expropriations are a subset of deprivations and thus 
the Court first analyzed the case in terms of Section 25(1) to determine 
if the deprivation was arbitrary.35 
Coming from the U.S. perspective, one would expect that a 
standard of non-arbitrariness, much like the U.S. constitutional standard 
of rational basis review, would be a very low hurdle for the state to get 
over.36 If South Africa followed this rather plain meaning approach to 
the term, most laws that resulted in the deprivation of property would 
be upheld. This would severely limit the possibility of any remedies for 
regulatory takings. There still may be some room for the doctrine in 
those cases where the deprivation was so severe as to amount to an 
expropriation. 
The Constitutional Court in FNB did not, however, adopt mere 
rationality review. The Court held that a deprivation of property was 
arbitrary if there was not sufficient reason for the deprivation or if it was 
procedurally unfair.37 Under U.S. rational basis review, laws do not 
need to be procedurally fair and do not require a sufficient reason for 
the deprivation beyond a conceivable rational relationship to the 
government’s legitimate end.38 The Court in FNB then went further and 
set out several different factors that would go into determining the 
                                                 
33 FNB 2002 4 SA 768 (CC), 2002 7 BCLR 702 (CC) para. 100. 
34 Id. at para. 1. 
35 Id. at para. 57. 
36 Under rational basis review of governmental conduct if a law is any way rationally related to a legitimate 
governmental purpose it will be upheld. The law does not need to be a good law or a wise law. It does not 
need to have a good means – ends fit and therefore it may be both overly broad and under inclusive. 
37 FNB 2002 4 SA 768 (CC) at para. 100. 
38 Under rational basis review, the government is not required to justify the law in question. Rather, the 
burden is on the challenger of a law to disprove “every conceivable basis” for the legislation, regardless of 
what the actual basis for the law was. Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1993). 
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degree of scrutiny or exactness required to establish a “sufficient 
reason.”39 These factors would determine whether the means-ends test 
of mere rationality review would suffice or if substantive 
proportionality review was required.40 Substantive proportionality as 
reflected in the Section 36(1) limitations clause, requires that a 
limitation be reasonable and justifiable given a whole host of factors.41 
The factors that go into determining the level of justification or scrutiny 
between mere rationality and substantive proportionality include:  
 
 the relationship between the purpose of the 
regulation and the person effected;  
 the relationship between the purpose of the 
deprivation and the nature of the property (with 
deprivations involving land and corporeal movables 
requiring more justification than deprivations of other 
property rights); 
 the extent of the deprivation; and  
 the number of incidents of ownership affected 
(i.e., the number and types of sticks in the bundle of 
rights) (with a more compelling purpose being required 
for all the incidents of ownership as opposed to fewer 
incidents and incidents only being partially impacted).42   
 
As Theunis Roux notes, this approach leaves the courts a great 
deal of discretion to either show deference to “important social reform 
programmes, such as land reform or black economic empowerment” or 
“to ratchet up the level of review” in cases where “the state 
overzealously regulates property in pursuit of questionable goals.43 Of 
course, like all multi-factor balancing tests and sliding scales, flexibility 
                                                 
39 FNB, 2002 4 SA 768 (CC) at para. 100. 
40 Id. It should be noted that South Africa does not have what in the U.S. is called strict scrutiny or 
intermediate scrutiny.  It rather has a fluid test that is set out in sections 36. See supra note 35. 
41 Id. Proportionality review is the review required by the limitations provision in Section 36(1) of the 
Constitution, which requires:  
The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of general 
application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open 
and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into 
account all relevant factors, including— 
(a) the nature of the right; 
(b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation; 
(c) the nature and extent of the limitation; 
(d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and 
(e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose. 
42 Id. para 100. 
43 Roux, supra note 22, at 274. 
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comes at the expense of predictability.  
This approach to Section 25(1) arbitrary deprivations leaves 
room for the possibility of regulatory takings or constructive 
expropriations. Theunis Roux suggests, and Frank Michelman accepts, 
that what might make a deprivation arbitrary is the lack of just and 
equitable compensation.44 While this may be implied from the FNB 
case, I do not think that it clearly follows, and it is not entailed or 
required. If compensation was required to avoid a finding of 
arbitrariness, this would effectively collapse the distinction between 
section 25(1) deprivations and 25(2) expropriations. There is still ample 
room for laws that deprive individuals of their property in non-arbitrary 
ways that do not provide just and equitable compensation. As we will 
see below, the Agri-South Africa case provides one such example.45 
As noted above, the Court in FNB characterized expropriations 
as a subset of the larger category of deprivations.46 This means that cases 
involving section 25(2) expropriations must also satisfy the 
requirements of section 25(1) deprivations. As Roux notes, this has the 
effect of getting rid of the problem of regulatory takings or constructive 
expropriations, because laws that “go too far” by destroying all 
economically viable use of the property, or which interfere with 
investment backed expectations, will be struck down as arbitrary.47 
Further, in cases like FNB where the state has expropriated property 
without compensation, one must first pass the section 25(1) analysis 
before ever reaching 25(2).  
In FNB, the Court struck down the law in question as arbitrary, 
based upon the factors listed above. In particular, it held that while the 
legislative end of collecting customs debts was legitimate and 
important, the means used to satisfy the debt cast the net too wide.48 
Here there was no nexus between the property and the debt, nor the 
owner and the debt, and thus there was “no sufficient reason . . . for 
section 114 to deprive persons other than the customs debtor of their 
goods.”49 As Roux points out, however, the law never would have been 
challenged if the legislative scheme had provided compensation to 
bank.50 Thus, he concludes that the failure to compensate made the 
                                                 
44 Id. at 277; Frank Michelman, Chapter 17, Against Regulatory Takings: In Defense of a Two-Stage Inquiry: 
A Reply to Theunis Roux, in CONSTITUTIONAL CONVERSATIONS 292 (2009). 
45 Agri South Africa v. Minister for Minerals and Energy (Agri) 2013 4 SA 1 (CC). See text accompanying 
notes 66-96 below. 
46 FNB, 2002 4 SA 768 (CC) at para. 57.  
47 Roux, supra note 22, at 277. 
48 FNB, 2002 4 SA 768 (CC) at para. 108. 
49 Id. at para. 108. 
50 Roux, supra note 22, at 277. 
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scheme arbitrary.51  
In his chapter, Roux speculates that while the usual remedy for 
an arbitrary deprivation would be invalidity, the courts could develop 
constitutional damages for violations of Section 25(1) under the courts’ 
Section 38 power to grant appropriate relief.52 While I agree that this 
would be perfectly appropriate, at this stage the Courts in South Africa 
have not developed such a remedy.  It is important to remember that the 
limited remedy that is available (invalidity) is only for arbitrary 
deprivations.53 Non-arbitrary deprivations of property rights receive no 
remedy at all.  
It is important to note that damages for one class of U.S. 
“regulatory” takings is not precluded by this analysis.54 Cases where 
local government has harmed one’s property through physical invasion, 
like flooding, damage caused by roadworks or what some have called 
government enterprise harms, can result in compensation, although not 
through the law of property per se, but through normal delictual (or tort 
liability) actions.55  Because South Africa does not provide provincial 
or local immunity from delict actions,56 there was no need to develop 
property law exceptions to these otherwise straightforward torts or 
delicts for wrongful, negligent or intentional causation of harm to 
                                                 
51 Id. 
52 Id. at 278. He further notes that this would approximate the German approach of paying equalization 
payments for disproportionate regulations.   
53 There remains the possibility that an arbitrary deprivation could be justified under the Section 36(1) 
limitations clause analysis. As Roux points out it would be rare for a law that was found to be arbitrary was 
somehow reasonable and justifiable under Section 36(1). Roux p. 280. Nonetheless, it is theoretically 
possible. Frank Michelman discusses the possibility in his chapter 17 Reply to Roux. Michelman, supra 
note 41, at 298-302. 
54 Krier and Sterk rightly point out that these are not cases of regulatory takings at all, but are rather implicit 
takings that are treated much like tort cases under state law. Krier and Sterk note that “Courts often evaluate 
taking claims in the enterprise and flooding contexts in the same way they evaluate tort claims when the 
tortfeasor is someone other than the government.” Krier and Sterk, supra note 14, at 72 (noting that the 
property claim is a way around sovereign immunity). 
55 See, e.g., Abrahamse v. Municipality of East London and Another, Municipality of East London and 
Another v. Abrahamse (483/95, 513/95) [1997] ZASCA 38; [1997] 2 All SA 651 (A) (12 May 1997) for a 
case involving suit against a municipality for a water pipe burst that damaged plaintiff’s property. This is 
why these non-regulatory forms of “regulatory” takings, or implicit takings results in a much higher 
percentage of successful claims in the U.S. than actual regulation based regulatory takings claims. See Krier 
and Sterk, supra note 14, at table 2. The percentages are around triple those of Penn Central type balancing 
cases. 
56 South Africa followed English law on this point during the colonial period and continued the tradition 
after. It in fact went further and passed legislation abrogating Crown immunity for the executive branch of 
central government with the Crown Liabilities Act 37 of 1888 (Cape); Crown Suits Act 14 of 1894 (Natal); 
Crown Liabilities Ordinance 51 of 1903 (Transvaal); Crown Liabilities Ordinance 44 of 1903 (Orange River 
Colony); and after union the Crown Liabilities Act 1 of 1910. Immunity remains waived under the State 
Liability Act 20 of 1957 for vicarious liability, and as noted, the provinces and municipalities have never 
had immunity from delictual suit. See, e.g. Alistair Price, State Liability and Accountability (2015) Acta 
Juridica 313-335; The Impact of the Bill of Rights on State Delictual Liability for Negligence in South Africa, 
Obligations V Conference: Rights and Private Law, St Anne's College, Oxford University (2010), 
http://uct.academia.edu/AlistairPrice/Papers.  
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property.  
In cases where compensation is offered for an expropriation or 
where the parties have focused on the Section 25(2) expropriation 
requirements, the Court has skipped over Section 25(1) and gone 
directly to Section 25(2). This occurred in the cases of Du Toit v. 
Minister of Transport;57 Haffejee v. eThekwini Municipality;58 and in 
Agri South Africa v. Minister for Minerals and Energy (Agri).59  
B.  Distinguishing Expropriations from Deprivations and Closing 
the Door on Compensation? 
In the Constitutional Court case of Reflect All 1025 CC v. MEC 
for Public Transport, Gauteng,60 the Court addressed the purpose 
behind the distinction between deprivation and expropriations, noting 
that: 
 
The purpose of the distinction between expropriation and 
deprivation by regulatory measures is to enable the state 
to regulate the use of property for public good without 
the fear of incurring liability to owners of property 
affected in the course of such regulation.61 
 
These obiter dicta from the Constitutional Court signal that the 
failure of the government to provide compensation for deprivations 
would not, as a general rule, lead the courts to find the deprivation 
arbitrary. It also suggests that the Court would be hesitant to award 
constitutional damages.62 The Court went on to note that “courts should 
be cautious not to extend the meaning of expropriation to situations 
where the deprivation does not have the effect of the property being 
acquired by the state.”63 It noted that the Supreme Court of Appeal, in a 
case with very similar facts, had considered whether there might be 
                                                 
57 2006 1 SA 297 (CC), 2005 11 BCLR 1053 (CC). 
58 2011 6 SA 134 (CC). The plaintiffs in this case argued that sections of the Expropriations Act that allowed 
for expropriation and dispossession of property before the amount of compensation was determined violated 
the requirements of Section 25(2)(b). The Court held that requiring this in all circumstances would violate 
the Section 25(3) requirement that “The amount of the compensation and the time and manner of payment 
must be just and equitable, reflecting an equitable balance between the public interest and the interests of 
those affected, having regard to all relevant circumstances.” While the equitable balance would often require 
that this be determined in advance, this would not always be the case, e.g., in cases of emergency.  
59 2013 4 SA 1 (CC). This case will be discussed below. 
60 2009 (6) SA 391 (CC). 
61 Id. at para. 63.  
62 As noted above the federal rule in the U.S. prior to 1987 was merely to provide declaratory or injunctive 
relief for regulatory takings. See supra note 22.  
63 Reflect All 1025 CC v. MEC for Public Transport, Gauteng 2009 (6) SA 391 (CC) at para. 64. 
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room to develop the doctrine of constructive expropriation for cases 
where “a public body utilises its power to regulate private property so 
excessively that it may be characterised as expropriation; in other 
words, when the regulation in a particular case goes too far.”64 After 
noting that it was doubtful that this would be appropriate in the South 
African constitutional order, it held that the present case was not a 
proper case for developing such a doctrine.65 It concluded that “If 
regulation in cases such as the present were to be characterised as 
amounting to expropriation, government would be crippled in 
discharging its obligations in regulating the use of private property for 
public good.”66 The Court held that no compensation was due because 
the state did not acquire the applicant’s land, but rather, only impeded 
its use and development due to proposed road development plans.67  
Because deprivations do not give rise to compensation unless 
one can show an expropriation, there is a strong incentive for property 
rights holders to fit their claim into Section 25(2) where they at least 
have the chance of “just and equitable” compensation.  
C.  Agri South Africa: Expropriation or Custodianship 
In the 2013 case of Agri South Africa, the parties agreed that the 
Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act 28 of 2002 
(MPRDA) did not arbitrarily deprive the petitioners of their property.68 
Rather, it claimed that under the Act, the state had expropriated its 
mineral rights. Prior to the MPRDA, landowners in South Africa owned 
the exclusive rights to the minerals below their land which entitled them 
to fully use those rights, or to prevent the use of those rights.69 The law 
                                                 
64 Id. at para. 65 (citing to Steinberg v. South Peninsula Municipality 2001 (4) SA 1243 (SCA) at paras 6-
8). 
65 Id. at para. 65.  
66 Id. 
67 The case involved applicants affected by preliminary designs for roads or highways under the regulatory 
scheme in the Infrastructure Act. Id. at para. 6. Note that this cases is what in the U.S. would be termed a 
condemnation blight case. As Krier and Sterk note, landowners generally lose condemnation blight cases. 
See Krier and Sterk, supra note 14, at table 2. (Landowners are only successful about 20% of the time). This 
is so, they speculate because to allow compensation for such cases could result in officials shying away 
from “engaging in useful public discourse about construction of roads or public facilities.” Id. at 75. 
In the present case of Reflect All, the effects on each of the eight applicants are detailed in footnote 6, but 
include: the denial of  access to the properties on which the fist applicant plans to construct a shopping 
centre; the prevention of the development of 600 luxury cluster houses by the second applicant; the 
encroachment onto significant amounts of  land on proposed townships by the third, fourth and sixth 
applicants; the inability of the fifth and seventh applicant to sell their property for the previous market value 
given that due to the road plans the properties cannot be rezoned; and the eighth applicant’s property is 
affected by a proposed road that will allegedly limit the number of stands available for development. Reflect 
All 1025 CC v. MEC for Public Transport, Gauteng, 2009 (6) SA 391 (CC). 
68 See Items 6-8 of Schedule II to the MPRDA.  
69 Agri South Africa v. Minister for Minerals and Energy 2013 4 SA 1 (CC) at para. 7. 
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developed to allow landowners to sever their mineral rights through 
notarial deeds,70 register these deeds,71 and then to further alienate the 
rights through cession, leases, and mortgage bonds.72 The rights formed 
part of the estate and could be bequeathed as well.73 
The MPRDA froze the ability to sell, lease or cede these “old 
order” mineral rights until they were converted into new order mineral 
rights under the Act,74 and the Act abolished the mineral rights owner’s 
right to “sterilize” the rights.75  In other words, the right to not sell or 
exploit the minerals under the land were taken away by the Act. Under 
the MPRDA, mineral rights owners had a limited time period to use and 
convert their old order rights into new order rights or they would lose 
them.76 The new order rights are still regarded as “limited real rights” 
under the Act,77 but they cannot be transferred or encumbered without 
permission from the Minister,78 and they are not perpetual but are 
limited in duration.79 
Given that these rights were taken away by the state, one may be 
led to believe that it logically followed that the property in question had 
been expropriated.80 Professor Johan D van der Vyver argued that the 
Act resulted in the Nationalization of mineral rights and constituted an 
expropriation.81 The court of first instance, the High Court, in fact held 
that the petitioner had been deprived of a right and that the deprivation 
amounted to an expropriation.82 The Constitutional Court held, 
however, that since the state did not acquire the rights that it took, but 
merely held them as custodians for the South African people, there was 
no expropriation.83 The Court held that to prove expropriation a 
claimant must establish “sufficient congruence” or “substantial 
similarity” between what was lost and what was acquired by the state.84 
                                                 
70 Id. at para. 8. 
71 Id. at para. 9. 
72 Id. at para. 10. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. at para. 2. 
75 Id. As the court further elaborates in para. 66, “What the MPRDA in effect did was to put an end to the: 
(i) ability to sterilise or not to exploit minerals; (ii) previously unfettered entitlement to sell, lease or cede 
the mineral right at any time; and (iii) mineral right or unused old order right for which a prospecting or 
mining right could not be acquired in terms of the transitional provisions.”    
76 Marias, supra note 21, at 3042.  
77 See MPRDA § 51. 
78 See MPRDA § 11(1). 
79 See MPRDA §§ 17-19.  
80 Under the previous Minerals Act, forced exploitation of mineral rights was considered an expropriation. 
Agri South Africa v. Minister for Minerals and Energy (Agri) 2013 4 SA 1 (CC) at para. 70. 
81 Johan D. van der Vyver, Nationalization of Mineral Rights in South Africa 2012 DE JURE 125-42, 141.  
82 Agri South Africa v. Minister for Minerals and Energy (Agri) 2013 4 SA 1 (CC) at para. 18.  
83 Id. at paras. 58-59. 
84 The Court stated, “To prove expropriation, a claimant must establish that the state has acquired the 
substance or core content of what it was deprived of.  In other words, the rights acquired by the state do not 
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As the Court concluded, “[t]here can be no expropriation in 
circumstances where deprivation does not result in property being 
acquired by the state.”85 
The Court contrasted the present case with classic cases of 
expropriation where the government takes land for roads or 
development or when it acquires mineral right to exploit them.86 Here 
the State did not acquire these rights to exploit the minerals, but rather 
is a “a facilitator or a conduit through which broader and equitable 
access to mineral and petroleum resources can be realised.”87 Although 
the Court declined to analyze or explore the limits of the concept of 
custodianship, it held that custodianship under the Act did not amount 
to an expropriation.88 
 The majority opinion took pains to emphasize that section 25 
required a balance between private property rights and the public 
interest.89 As the court stated, section 25 of the Constitution imposes the 
obligation “not to over-emphasise private property rights at the expense 
of the state’s social responsibilities.”90 The Court also emphasized the 
role of the present legislation in addressing the legacy of apartheid. In 
the first paragraph the Court stated: 
 
Regrettably, the architecture of the apartheid system 
placed about 87 percent of the land and the mineral 
resources that lie in its belly in the hands of 13 percent 
of the population.  Consequently, white South Africans 
wield real economic power while the overwhelming 
majority of black South Africans are still identified with 
unemployment and abject poverty.  For they were unable 
to benefit directly from the exploitation of our mineral 
resources by reason of their landlessness, exclusion and 
poverty.  To address this gross economic inequality, 
legislative measures were taken to facilitate equitable 
access to opportunities in the mining industry.91 
 
Later in the judgment, the Court stated: 
                                                 
have to be exactly the same as the rights that were lost. There would, however, have to be sufficient 
congruence or substantial similarity between what was lost and what was acquired.” Id. at para. 58. 
85 Id. at para. 59. 
86 Id. at para. 68. 
87 Id. at para. 68. 
88 Id. at para. 71. 
89 Id. at paras. 61-62.  
90 Id. at para. 62. 
91 Id. at para. 1. Namely the MPRDA. 
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We must therefore interpret section 25 with due regard 
to the gross inequality in relation to wealth and land 
distribution in this country.  By design, the MPRDA is 
meant to broaden access to business opportunities in the 
mining industry for all, especially previously 
disadvantaged people.  It is not only about the promotion 
of equitable access, but also about job creation, the 
advancement of the social and economic welfare of all 
our people, the promotion of economic growth and the 
development of our mineral and petroleum resources for 
the common good of all South Africans.92 
 
Towards the end of its judgment the Court stated: 
 
The MPRDA constitutes a breakthrough the barriers of 
exclusivity to equal opportunity and to the commanding 
heights of wealth-generation, economic development 
and power.  It seeks to address the injustices of the past 
in the economic sector of our country in a more balanced 
way, by treating individual property rights with the care, 
fairness and sensitivity they deserve.93 
 
A few remaining points are worth noting. First, although the 
Court did not find an expropriation in this case, it did leave the door 
open to expropriation claims under the MPRDA. As the Court stated, 
“It would, however, be inappropriate to decide definitively, that 
expropriation is in terms of the MPRDA incapable of ever being 
established . . . I accept that a case could be properly pleaded and argued, 
to demonstrate that expropriation did take place.”94 Secondly, three 
justices on the Court, Cameron, Froneman,  and van der Westhuizen, 
concurred in the result but disagreed with the proposition that the state 
needed to acquire property in order for an expropriation to take place.95 
Froneman J concurred in the result of the case on the basis that the rights 
conferred on the applicant under the MPRDA constituted just and 
equitable compensation for the rights taken away and lost.96 
                                                 
92 Id. at para. 61. 
93 Id. at para. 73. 
94 Id. at para. 75. This due in part to the fact that item 12 of Schedule II has an express provision for 
expropriations under the Act. Earlier in the judgment the Court held that item 12 was like the result of an 
overly cautious legislature rather than an indication that the Act worked an expropriation. Id.  
95 Id. at paras. 77-79. 
96 Id. at para. 79.  
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Froneman J, in his rather strong concurrence, after pointing out 
that foreign jurisprudence “recognises that expropriation may take place 
even if the disposed rights or property have not been acquired by the 
state,”97 warned of the consequences of the majority opinion’s rationale. 
In Froneman J’s opinion, under the majority’s reasoning, the state could 
abolish all private ownership of property without it amounting to an 
expropriation, and thereby without requiring just and equitable 
compensation, as long as the state was only transferring those rights to 
others as a custodian. As he stated: 
 
If private ownership of minerals can be abolished 
without just and equitable compensation - by the 
construction that when the state allocates the substance 
of old rights to others it does not do so as the holder of 
those rights - what prevents the abolition of private 
ownership of any, or all, property in the same way?  This 
construction in effect immunises, by definition, any 
legislative transfer of property from existing property 
holders to others if it is done by the state as custodian of 
the country’s resources, from being recognised as 
expropriation.98 
 
Froneman also argues that even if what is required is acquisition 
by the state, the state in this case acquired the right to allocate and 
dispose of the right to exploit the minerals.99  
In the conclusion to his 2012 DE JURE article, van der Vyver 
argued that nationalization of the mineral and petroleum resources 
under the MDRNA “clearly constitutes an instance of expropriation 
within the meaning of section 25 of the Constitution.”100 He further 
argued that if expropriation required acquisition, then “vesting the 
ownership in the State, either as the personification of “all the people of 
South Africa” or as a public trustee of the people’s ‘common heritage,’ 
                                                 
97 Id. at para. 103.   
98 Id. at para. 105. 
99 Id. at para. 81, 106. Note that the result here can be contrasted with the result in Kaiser Aetna v. United 
States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979), a case involving the determination that the plaintiff’s property was subject to 
a federal navigable servitude. The Supreme Court held that since the right to exclude is “one of the most 
essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property,” this amounted to a 
taking. Id. at 176. Similarly, in Hodel v. Irving, the Supreme Court found that federal regulations that 
prevented Native Americans from devising small fractional interests in Indian trust lands, was also a taking 
since “the right to pass on property―to one’s family, in particular―has been “part of the Anglo-American 
legal system since feudal times.” Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 716 (1987).  
100 van der Vyver, supra note 81, at 141. 
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fully satisfies this demand.”101 For better or worse, the majority of the 
Constitutional Court did not agree. 
D.  Contrasting Cases from the U.S. 
Agri SA, can be contrasted to two U.S. Supreme Court cases, one 
concerning the abrogation of inheritance rights and the other involving 
the granting of public access to a privately developed waterway.  
The first, Hodel v. Irving (1980), concerned a federal law 
preventing the inheritance of Sioux Nation land that consisted of less 
than two percent of the owner’s land and that had earned less than $100 
in the prior year. Any land devised in this way would revert back to the 
tribe.102 Because this abrogated the right to pass on property to one’s 
heirs, the Court held it to be a taking.103 Here the taking was not based 
on the U.S. government taking title to property, nor even occupying the 
property, but of abrogating a right in the property. Remember in Agri 
SA one was no longer allowed to sell, lease or cede the “old order” 
mineral rights and even if converted to new order rights, one could not 
transfer or encumber the right and the right was no longer perpetual, but 
limited in duration. Nonetheless, the Agri SA Court did not find an 
expropriation had occurred. 
The second case, Kaeser Aetna v. U.S., involved a property 
owner that dug a channel connecting its pond to the ocean. Once this 
was complete, the U.S. Corps of Engineers determined that, under 
federal law, this made the water a navigable waterway that was open for 
use by the public at large.104 Here the right to exclude others was taken 
from the property owner. Again, this can be contrasted to mineral rights 
owners in Agri SA who lost the right to sterilize, or in other words, who 
lost the right to exclude others from extracting minerals from their land, 
and who in fact lost much of the use of the right in question.  Although 
more sticks in the bundle of rights were lost in Agri, SA than in Kaeser 
Aetna, the Court found no expropriation. 
E.  Legislation in the Wake of Agri SA 
In the aftermath of the Agri SA decision, South Africa drafted a 
                                                 
101 Id. at 141. He further notes that this was the position taken by the Supreme Court of Appeal in Agri South 
Africa.  
102 Hodel, 481 U.S. at 704, 722-23.  
103 Id. at 715-17. 
104 Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 167. 
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Preservation and Development of Agricultural Land Framework Bill,105 
a new Expropriations Bill,106 and a Property Valuations Bill.107 These 
Bills have caused a stir amongst some segments of the population, and 
especially by members of the Democratic Alliance, who opposed these 
bills.108 The Draft Preservation and Development of Agricultural Land 
Framework Bill draws on the Agri SA decision by stating that 
“Agricultural land is the common heritage of all the people of South 
Africa and the Department of Agriculture, Forestries and Fisheries is the 
custodian thereof for the benefit of all South Africans.”109 Under the 
draft Bill, the Department is empowered to “approve, reject, control, 
administer and manage any rezoning or subdivision of agricultural 
land.”110 The Expropriations Bill, which was passed by parliament in 
February 2016, largely tracks Section 25 of the Constitution. It defines 
expropriations as compulsory acquisitions, thus tracking the language 
of the majority opinion in Agri SA and it does not recognize “indirect” 
or “regulatory” takings.111  
This suite of draft legislation has led some people, in particular 
Dr. Anthea Jeffrey, Head of Policy Research at the Institute for Race 
Relations,112 to argue that this is opening up South Africa to land grabs, 
regulatory takings without compensation and expropriations with below 
                                                 
105 PRESERVATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF AGRICULTURAL LAND FRAMEWORK BILL,  
http://www.nda.agric.za/docs/media/Draft%20Preservation%20and%20Development%20of%20%20Agri
cultural%20Land%20Framenwork%20Bill.pdf. 
106 MINISTER OF PUBLIC WORKS, REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA, Expropriation Bill [B 4B—2015],  
 https://www.parliament.gov.za/storage/app/media/Docs/bill/613881_1.pdf. 
107 MINISTER OF RURAL DEVELOPMENT AND LAND REFORM, REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA, Property 
Valuation Bill [B 54—2013], http://www.gov.za/sites/www.gov.za/files/36478_gen504.pdf. 
http://www.parliament.gov.za/live/commonrepository/Processed/20131114/554372_1.pdf. 
108 See the debates over the bill; see also National Assembly 2014, https://pmg.org.za/hansard/18525/. 
109 Draft Preservation and Development of Agricultural Land Framework Bill §3(1), 
http://www.nda.agric.za/docs/media/Draft%20Preservation%20and%20Development%20of%20%20Agri
cultural%20Land%20Framenwork%20Bill.pdf. 
110 Id. § 3(2). 
111 See, e.g., E Du Plessis, Criticism of Land Rights Bill is Off Target, BUSINESS DAY (Feb. 26, 2016), 
http://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/opinion/2016-02-26-criticism-of-land-rights-bill-is-off-target/. 
112 Note that this institute is a right leaning Afrikaner Center. The Center for Race Relations promotes the 
following ideas:  
 That the State should be small but effective in carrying out its core 
functions 
 That people should be treated as individuals and not as members of groups 
 That property rights should be protected so that the poor can accumulate 
wealth and assets 
 That strong independent institutions in the media, judiciary, and civil 
society should be empowered to hold powerful interest groups in business and 
government to account 
 That economic freedom is as important as political freedom and that 
people should be empowered to stand on their own feet to work, start businesses, 
invest, and own property in order to improve their lives.  
SOUTH AFRICAN INSTITUTE OF RACE RELATIONS, WHAT WE DO, http://irr.org.za/about-us/what-we-do. 
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market compensation.113 
While all of this is true, it is somewhat remarkable that it has 
taken until 2016 to replace the apartheid era Expropriations Act 63 of 
1975. While it is true that the 1975 Act provided for market rate 
compensation,114 Section 25 of the Constitution, adopted in 1996, 
clearly contemplates a different mechanism for determining what 
compensation is just and fair for an expropriation. Thus, it would be odd 
in the extreme if the new legislation merely adopted the apartheid era 
mechanism. It would be even more off if that legislation ignored the 
interpretation of Section 25 by the Constitutional Court.  
The values that animated compensation for expropriations under 
the 1975 law are not unfamiliar. As WJ Du Plessis argues, it was based 
on the idea that the legislator does not intend to take away rights without 
compensation and that no single individual should have to sacrifice their 
property without compensation for something that benefits the public at 
large.115 While the second consideration still animates the law, the first 
is put on shakier ground given the history of property rights under 
apartheid. Section 25 reflects this fact with the requirement to not only 
balance those rights against the public interest, but to scrutinize the 
given right’s pedigree in the given case. Unfortunately, the Courts have 
not fully embraced the compensation requirements of the Section 25(3). 
As du Plessis notes, post-apartheid decisions have largely 
returned to the pre-constitutional rationale for compensation and have 
endeavored to put the property owner in the same position he would 
have been, but for the expropriation.116 This has also resulted in the 
centrality of market value as the measure for compensation.117  
                                                 
113 Dr. Anthea Jeffrey, South Africa has taken a big step towards abolishing property rights Rand Daily 
Mail (May 27, 2016), http://www.rdm.co.za/politics/2016/03/11/sa-has-taken-a-big-step-towards-
abolishing-property-rights; see also, Dr. Anthea Jeffrey, LETTER: Expropriation Bill analysis flawed 
BUSINESS DAY (Mar. 01, 2016). Dr. Anthea Jeffrey, Zuma’s land grab urgings to traditional chiefs; 
desperate move by a declining force, THOUGHT LEADERS (Mar. 17, 2015), 
http://www.biznews.com/thought-leaders/2015/03/17/zumas-land-grab-urgings-to-traditional-chiefs-a-
desperate-move-by-a-declining-force/. 
114 See Expropriation Act of 63 of 1975 § 12(1) (S. Afr.). 
115 WJ du Plessis, Valuation in The Constitution Era 18(5) POTCHEFSTROOM ELECTRONIC LAW JOURNAL, 
1728 (2015). 
116 Id. at 1731-32. Du Plessis analyzes the following cases in support of this proposition. Du Toit v. 
Minister of Transport 2006 1 SA 297 (CC) para. 22; Cape Town v. Helderberg Park Development (Pty) 
Ltd 2007 1 SA 1 (SCA) para. 21; Khumalo v. Potgieter 2000 2 All SA 456 (LCC) para. 22; Hermanus v. 
Dep’t of Land Affairs: In Re Erven 3535 and 3536;  Goodwood 2001 1 SA 1030 (LCC) para. 15; Ex Parte 
Former Highland Residents; In Re Ash v. Department of Land Affairs 2000 2 All SA 26 (LCC) paras. 34-
35; Haakdoornbult Boerdery CC v. Mphela 2007 5 SA 596 (SCA) para. 48; and Mhlanganisweni Community 
v. Minister of Rural Development and Land Reform 2012 ZALCC 7 (19 Apr. 2012) (drawing on foreign dicta 
to show that the purpose of compensation is recompense). 
117 Id. at 1733-34. 
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The Court in Ex Parte Former Highland Residents devised a 
two-step approach that started with the market value and then 
determined whether that value should be adjusted upwards or 
downwards depending on the factors in Section 25(3).118 This approach 
makes some sense given that market value at least gives one a sum that 
can be worked with. The other factors don’t give one much of a 
benchmark for getting the valuation going.  
However, as du Plessis aptly argues, there are numerous ways 
for determining “market value” and these different approaches embody 
different substantive values, resulting in different valuations.119 Some 
ways of determining market value favor the property owner and some 
make it less onerous on the state.120 Given this fact, she questions 
whether the market value approach is such a sure, or reliable, way of 
determining value and whether the “just and equitable” approach is 
actually less reliable.121 She also argues against the continued centrality 
of market value in calculating compensation.122 
 Under Section 25(3) and the new Expropriations Bill, market 
value is just one factor among many. While some version of market 
valuation might be a starting point, it is important to remember that it is 
not the central point or the default point. The central point of Section 
25(3) is not only just compensation, but just and equitable 
compensation. Neither the U.S. Constitution, nor the South African 
Constitution, require market value compensation for takings. In the 
U.S., the market value has been used to provide corrective justice, to 
give back in proportion to what was taken, but as noted at the outset, 
several factors complicate the analysis of what justice and equity may 
require in the South African context. 
As the factors indicate, compensation may be impacted by the 
historical and current use of property, for instance if one is not putting 
the property to its full or best use, but is letting it go fallow. 
                                                 
118 Ex Parte Former Highland Residents; In Re: Ash v. Department of Land Affairs 2000 (2) All SA 26 
(LCC) paras. 34-35. (S. Afr.). 
119 Du Plessis, supra note 115, at 1743. Du Plessis not only address the three common approaches to 
determining market value in South Africa, namely the comparative sales approach, the income capitalization 
approach, and the cost approach (1737-1741), but also several approaches used in the U.S., namely harm 
versus benefit, highest and best use, permissible but unenacted regulations, and benefit offset and the 
average reciprocity of advantage (1743-1746). 
120 See, e.g., Du Plessis, supra note 115, at 1748-51. What properties are compared for market value, who 
bears the cost of litigation, who bear the risk of the highest and best use of the property, whether one allows 
unenacted but potential regulations to bear on the cost and when one sets the date for an expropriation (e.g., 
should the state compensate for lower property values that result from city planning before the expropriation 
takes place). For some of these considerations see Du Plessis at 1748-51. Du Plessis relies on C. Serkin 
“The Meaning of Value: Assessing Just Compensation for Regulatory Takings” 2004-2005 NWULR 688 – 
692 for her analysis of U.S. market value approaches and the substantive values they entail.  
121 Du Plessis, supra note 115, at 1728, 1743. 
122 Id. at 1751. 
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Underutilizing one’s property is a luxury in a country where so much of 
the population is in need and thus if one is not fully using one’s property, 
then perhaps the compensation should reflect the value of the property 
as used rather than what the market might provide if the property was 
put to its highest use. Further, if the history of the acquisition is dubious 
or was the result of apartheid policies that provided land to farmers at 
well below market rates, then perhaps that farmer should not receive a 
windfall as reflected in the current market price of the land. This would 
also be true if the value of land increased due to state investment or 
subsidies in capital improvement of the property. All of the 
considerations thus far arguably just go to determine what corrective 
justice might require. In other words, these considerations of what 
justice requires alone could justify considerable deviations from market 
value. Section 25 contemplates even further deviations once concerns 
over distributive justice, equity and the public interest are taken into 
account. Section 25(4) tells us that the public interest includes “the 
nation’s commitment to land reform, and to reforms to bring about 
equitable access to all South Africa's natural resources.”  
As noted at the outset, the remaining subsections of Section 25 
explicitly contemplate legislation that may constitute deprivations and 
expropriations of rights for the purposes of providing equitable access 
to lands, and to achieve land and water reform as a means to redress past 
racial discrimination.  Subsection 5 reads, “The state must take 
reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, 
to foster conditions which enable citizens to gain access to land on an 
equitable basis.”123 Subsection 8 clarifies that Section 25 cannot stand 
in the way of land and water reform that is designed to redress the results 
of past racial discrimination.124 This contemplates legislation that goes 
beyond corrective justice for discrete or specific cases of past 
discrimination and to distributive justice to address the resulting 
systemic inequality that resulted from apartheid. 
III.      U.S. FEDERAL AND STATE REMEDIES FOR TAKING AND 
REGULATORY TAKINGS 
The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides in 
                                                 
123 S. AFR. CONST., 1996 § 25(5). For a treatment of at least one of the drafter’s intentions behind this provision, see 
John G. Sprankling, INTERNATIONAL LAW OF PROPERTY 222 (2014).   
124 S. AFR. CONST., art. 25 § 8 1996. Subsection 8 states: “No provision of this section may impede the 
state from taking legislative and other measures to achieve land, water and related reform, in order to 
redress the results of past racial discrimination, provided that any departure from the provisions of this 
section is in accordance with the provisions of section 36(1). 
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simple language “Nor shall private property be taken for public use 
without just compensation.”125 Despite the simple language, this clause 
has generated considerable controversy, both in cases where the state 
has regulated property but has not literally taken, or acquired the 
property, and in the case of Kelo where property was taken for what 
some considered a dubious purpose. The Supreme Court in Kelo v. City 
of New London, held that the Fifth Amendment does not require literal 
public use, but the “broader and more natural interpretation of public 
use as ‘public purpose.’”126 In Kelo, the City used its power of eminent 
domain to seize private property (15 homes owned by 9 people) to sell 
to private developers, in order to help increase taxes and job creation. 
The property owners argued that taking private property to sell to private 
developers was not a public use and thus a violation of the Fifth 
Amendment’s takings clause. The Supreme Court held that a state may 
transfer property from one private party to another if future “use by the 
public” is the purpose of the taking.127  
As noted in the introduction, this generated considerable 
backlash and prompted numerous states to pass legislation to stop their 
state and local government from taking for public purposes and 
particular from taking for the purpose of stopping blight, nuisances or 
for business development.128 Under the U.S. federal system it is 
perfectly acceptable for states to restrict their own regulatory powers in 
order to protect private property. The literature on the state reaction to 
Kelo and what counts as a “public purpose” is vast and will not be 
addressed further below. Rather, the remainder of this paper will address 
what counted as a regulatory taking, before the time of the Roberts 
Court, what counts as a regulatory taking now under the Roberts Court 
and recent developments of what now counts as a regulatory taking at 
the state level. 
A.  Pre-Roberts Court Regulatory Takings 
Although it is unclear that the founding fathers ever 
contemplated that the Takings Clause would apply to regulatory 
                                                 
125 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
126 Kelo v. New London, 545 U.S. 469, 472 (U.S. 2005). Erwin Chemerinsky in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (5th 
ed. 2015) (noting that Kelo did not actually create a new rule with regards to the interpretation of public 
use. “The decision generated enormous controversy and the media presented it as a dramatic change in the 
law, while in reality the Court applied exactly the principle that was articulated decades ago: A taking is for 
public use so long as the government acts out of a reasonable belief that the taking will benefit the public. . 
. it is important to recognize that the case in no way changed the constitutional law in this area.” Id. at 693 
(quoting Berman v. Parker 348 U.S. 26, 32-33 (1954)). 
127 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 475, 489-90. 
128 See supra note 11. 
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takings,129 as early as 1922, in an opinion written by Justice Oliver 
Wendell Holmes, the Supreme Court found that if a regulation goes “too 
far” it will be recognized as a taking.130 In Pennsylvania Coal, a statute 
that prohibited the mining of coal in any manner that would cause the 
subsidence of the property was enacted to prevent companies from 
exercising mining rights in a way that was detrimental to the surface. 
They were required to leave columns of coal underground to support the 
surface. The issue before the court was whether the government 
regulation constituted a taking. The Court held that it was a taking 
because making it commercially impracticable to mine certain coal has 
nearly the same effect for constitutional purposes as appropriating or 
destroying it.131  
The Court in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New 
York introduced a balancing test to determine when regulations went too 
far.132 The three-part balancing test required a court to examine: (1) the 
character of the invasion, (2) the economic impact of the regulation as 
applied to the particular property, and (3) the property owner’s distinct 
investment backed expectations with respect to that property.133  Two 
years later in Agins v. City of Tiburon, the Court adopted a two part test 
to determine if the regulation amounted to a taking, namely: (1) does the 
regulation substantially advance a legitimate governmental interest and 
(2) does the regulation deprive the owner of economically viable use of 
property?134 In a unanimous decision, the court held that zoning 
ordinances that neither prevent the best use of the land nor extinguish a 
fundamental attribute of ownership are not takings.135  
In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, the Court held that 
the coastal protection plan, which prevented Lucas from developing the 
                                                 
129 Most scholars agree that the Takings Clause was originally intended only to apply to physical takings, 
not regulatory takings. See, e.g., William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings 
Clause and the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782, 782 (1995); see also Lucas v. South Carolina 
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1028 n.15 (1992) (stating “[E]arly constitutional theorists did not believe 
the Takings Clause embraced regulations of property at all.”). Cf. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE 
PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985). Of course, the founding fathers did not think the 
federal government would regulate to the extent that it does today, and the Fifth Amendment did not 
originally apply to the states. 
130 Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). 
131 Id. at 412-15. 
132 Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). 
133 Id. at 137-38 (holding that there was not a taking when the government designated a building as a 
historical landmark and prevented the owner from constructing a substantial expansion on top of the 
building). The Court emphasized that the regulation did not deny the owners all profitable use of the building 
and, in fact, had not even precluded all -development of the air rights above the building. Because 
designating the building a historic landmark had the effect only of decreasing the value of the property, and 
because it served an important purpose, the Court concluded that there was not a taking requiring just 
compensation. The regulation was reasonable for the public welfare. 
134 Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980). 
135 Id. at 261-63. 
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one million dollar property that he bought, amounted to a taking since 
it deprived him all economically or productive use of his land.136 This 
arguably leaves a good deal of individual landowners without a remedy 
when their property carries a larger share of the burden of regulations 
designed for the public interest. As noted in the introduction, this 
somewhat stingy approach to regulatory takings prompted a number of 
states to pass much more extensive regulatory takings laws.  
Before addressing the state law expansion of protection against 
regulatory takings, there have been a number of relatively recent 
decisions by the Supreme Court that are decisively more pro-property 
rights and considerably less government regulation friendly. 
B.  Roberts Court Regulatory Takings 
John Sprankling in his recent review of property under the 
Roberts Court argues that the Roberts Court has been much more pro-
property than the Rehnquist Court.137 Kelo was the last property 
decision of the Rehnquist Court,138 and since then, the Roberts Court 
has handed down a number of cases expanding the scope, and thereby, 
the protection of the Takings clause, thus providing remedies that were 
not available before. Notable cases include: Stop the Beach 
Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Department of Environmental 
Protection,139   Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management 
District,140 and Horne v. Department of Agriculture.141 Sprankling 
argues that these cases weaken the balancing approach of Penn Central 
as they usher in more “sweeping categorical rules” that make it more 
likely that the government’s action will be considered a taking.142  
Stop the Beach is important, not for its result, but for the fact 
that a majority of the Justices on the Court recognized that “a judicial 
decision which eliminates or substantially changes even a minor 
property right would violate the Constitution.”143 Koontz is important 
because it expanded the Nollan-Dolan rule for conditions on 
development, from those that granted a permit but took an easement, 
to those that denied a permit for a failure to either limit the 
                                                 
136 Lucas v. South Carolina, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016, 1019, 1027, 1032 (1992). 
137 John G. Sprankling, Property and the Roberts Court, 65 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 1 (2016). 
138 Kelo v. New London, was decided in the final year of the Rehnquist Court. 
139 Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 560 U.S. 702 (2010).    
140 Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586 (2013). 
141 Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419 (2015). 
142 Sprankling, supra note 137, at 16. 
143 Id. at 17. Sprankling did a fair amount of intellectual work before arriving at this conclusion. As he notes, 
“Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas and Alito would reach this result through the Takings Clause, 
while Justices Kennedy and Sotomayor would do so through the Due Process Clause.” Id. 
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development or spend money.144 Under the Nollan-Dolan cases, when 
the government conditions a discretionary granting of a permit or 
variance on a property owner the government must satisfy two 
requirements to avoid a finding that a taking has occurred: first, there 
must be a “nexus … between the legitimate state interest and the permit 
condition created,”145 They must be rationally related. Secondly, the 
burden must be roughly proportional to the justification for the 
condition.146 In the Koontz case, a bare majority of the Court held that 
“[t]he principles that undergird our decisions in Nollan and Dolan do 
not change depending on whether the government approves a permit 
on the condition that the applicant turn over property or denies a permit 
because the applicant refuses to do so.”147 Further, it stated that “[s]uch 
so-called ‘in lieu of’ fees are utterly common-place and they are 
functionally equivalent to other types of land use exactions.”148 It 
therefore held that “so-called ‘monetary exactions’ must satisfy the 
nexus and rough proportionality requirements of Nollan and Dolan.”149 
Justice Kagan writing for the four dissenters made a strong 
case for the breadth of impact of the decision when she wrote: 
 
By applying Nollan and Dolan to permit conditions 
requiring monetary payments—with no express 
limitation except as to taxes—the majority extends the 
Takings Clause, with its notoriously ‘difficult’ and 
‘perplexing’ standards, into the very heart of local land-
use regulation and service delivery. Cities and towns 
across the nation impose many kinds of permitting fees 
every day. Some enable a government to mitigate a new 
development's impact on the community, like increased 
traffic or pollution—or destruction of wetlands. Others 
cover the direct costs of providing services like sewage 
or water to the development. Still others are meant to 
limit the number of landowners who engage in a certain 
activity, as fees for liquor licenses do. All now must meet 
Nollan and Dolan’s nexus and proportionality tests . . . 
And the flexibility of state and local governments to take 
the most routine actions to enhance their communities 
                                                 
144 Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2586, 2595. 
145 Dolan, 512 U.S. at 374. 
146 Id. at 388-91. 
147 Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2595. 
148 Id. at 2599. 
149 Id.  
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will diminish accordingly.150 
 
Koontz, therefore provides a potential remedy where none existed 
before.151 
The more recent case of Horne v. Department of Agriculture is 
important for three reasons: (1) it establishes that personal property 
gets the same protection as real property,152 (2) it expanded the test for 
physical takings of property established in Loretto v. Teleprompter 
Manhattan CATV Corp,153 and (3) it awarded what it considered 
market value compensation, but ignored the government’s impact on 
the market value.  In Loretto, the Court found that a city ordinance that 
required building owners to provide a small amount of physical space 
for cable companies’ equipment amounted to a “permanent physical 
occupation of property” and was therefore a taking.154 Horne involved 
a Department of Agriculture program authorized under the 
Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937 that was designed to 
help raisin growers by stabilizing the national price for raisins. The 
agreement required growers to set aside a certain percentage of their 
crop for the account of the Government, free of charge.  During the 
years in questions this amounted to forty-seven percent of the crops.  
The government would then sell, donate or dispose of them in 
accordance with program guidelines. If there were any profits left over, 
the government would distribute them to the growers. The Hornes 
declined this “help” claiming that this was an uncompensated taking. 
The Supreme Court agreed, holding that since the Hornes would lose 
“the entire ‘bundle’ of property rights in the appropriated raisins― ‘the 
rights to possess, use and dispose of them.,’” this was a taking.155  
Although the government could have placed a regulatory limit on 
production without it amounting to a taking, here the government 
appropriated the property and thus, there was a taking.156 
                                                 
150 Id. at 2607 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
151 Sprankling, supra note 137, at 20 (noting “Before Koontz it was widely believed that the Takings Clause 
did not apply to fees or other general monetary obligations.” Id. Swartz criticizes the decision thus, “Under 
the Court’s reading of the Clause, non-elected, essentially life-tenured judges hold the power to determine 
the best policy to preserve wetlands in Florida. To the contrary, the Fifth Amendment does not grant judges 
the authority to weigh developer profits against the public interest under any interpretive theory.” Andrew 
William Schwartz, No Competing Theory of Constitutional Law Justifies Regulatory Takings Ideology 34 
STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 247, 249 (2015). 
152 The Court rejected the Ninth Circuit reasoning that the Takings Clause accords less protection to personal 
property than to real property. Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 750 F.3d. 1128, 1140 (9th Cir. 2014). 
153 See Loretto v. Teleprompter, 458 U.S. 419 (1982). 
154 Id. at 441. One might query whether this would be a taking in South Africa since the government did not 
acquire the title itself. 
155 Horne, 135 S. Ct. at 2428 (citing Loretto, 458 U.S. at 435). 
156 Id. 
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As Sprankling notes, the difference between Loretto and Horne 
is that Loretto eliminated all of the owner’s rights, whereas here the only 
relevant right was the right to dispose of the raisins and this was not 
completely destroyed because of the residual right to share in the 
proceeds of an any government sales.157 Sprankling argues that “After 
Horne, even a government “occupation” which leaves an owner with 
substantial property rights would seem to be a per se taking, regardless 
of the underlying policy basis.”158 
Horne exemplifies a very pro individual property rights stance 
against a government program that was designed to not only help Horne, 
but all other raisin growers.159 This effectively unravels a program that 
had been in place since the great depression and the New Deal. It is 
uncertain at this point whether or not this will turn out badly for the 
raisin industry, or other industries that are potentially impacted by this 
decision.160  
C.  The Remedy? 
The remedy delivered in Horne was that Horne would be 
relieved of the obligation to pay $483,843.53 which represented the fair 
market value of the raisins that he did not turn over to the government.161 
This fair market approach makes some sense given that this was the 
amount the government claimed from Horne.162 However, the 
government argued, and Justice Breyer in his concurrence agreed, that 
the case should have been remanded to determine whether Horne had 
been justly compensated.163  The argument was that there may not have 
been any compensation due if the Hornes would have complied with the 
order given that they would have also received a share of the proceeds 
                                                 
157 Sprankling, supra note 137, at 23-24. This is because the raisins were being farmed for commercial 
use, and thus the rights to possess and use them were not relevant. This point is echoed in Justice 
Sotomayor’s lone dissent where she argued that “it is not a per se taking if it does not result in the 
destruction of every property right.” Horne, 135 S. Ct. at 2419 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
158 Sprankling, supra note 137, at 24. 
159 The Cato institute celebrated it. Michael W. McConnell, The Raisin Case, 2015 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 
313, 313 (2015). 
160 As noted by Christopher E. Mills, in Raisin Cane: Takings Jurisprudence After Horne v. Department to 
Agriculture, 23 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1 (2015). “At least thirty-seven agricultural marketing orders still 
exist, and at least nine of those authorize some type of volume control. Some use a reserve mechanism 
similar to the raisin order, and some otherwise restrict how growers can dispose of the fruits of their labor.” 
Id. at 2. Of these two are most likely unconstitutional under Horne, while the others may be constitutional. 
Id. at 12-18.  
161 Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2432 (2015). 
162 Justice Roberts argues that “The Government has already calculated the amount of just compensation in 
this case, when it fined the Hornes the fair market value of the raisins: $483,843.53. 750 F.3d, at 1135, n.6. 
The Government cannot now disavow that valuation.” Id. at 2433. 
163 Id. at 2431-32; id. at 2433-35 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (with Justices Ginsburg and Kagan joining). 
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of any profits, and more importantly, the market price of raisins was 
higher because the program, namely the price support program, 
increased demand due to the program’s quality standards and 
promotional activities.164 The government, in fact argued that the 
Hornes would have received a net gain.165 
 The Majority rejected the argument with very little analysis.166 
If in fact the program was working, then the government’s contention 
has merit. The program only makes sense if on average raisin producers 
are better off under the program than without it. What the court allowed, 
in effect, was a windfall for the Hornes. They received the benefits of 
the program without paying any of the costs. They were in fact free 
riders.167  
   As noted, Justice Breyer with Justices Ginsburg and Kagan 
dissented with regards to Part III of the Court’s decision not to remand 
the case for a determination of whether any compensation would have 
been due if the Hornes had complied with the California Raisin 
Marketing Order’s reserve requirement.168 Breyer argued that the 
marketing order may afford just compensation and if that is the case 
then no taking would have taken  place.169 As Justice Breyer notes: 
 
The reserve requirement is intended, at least in part, to 
enhance the price that free-tonnage raisins will fetch on 
the open market . . . And any such enhancement matters. 
This Court’s precedents indicate that, when calculating 
the just compensation that the Fifth Amendment 
requires, a court should deduct from the value of the 
taken (reserve) raisins any enhancement caused by the 
                                                 
164 Id. at 2432. 
165 Id.   
166 As Justice Roberts stated, “The best defense may be a good offense, but the Government cites no support 
for its hypothetical-based approach, or its notion that general regulatory activity such as enforcement of 
quality standards can constitute just compensation for a specific physical taking. Instead, our cases have set 
forth a clear and administrable rule for just compensation: ‘The Court has repeatedly held that just 
compensation normally is to be measured by ‘the market value of the property at the time of the taking.’” 
United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24, 29, 105 S. Ct. 451, 83 L. Ed. 2d 376 (1984) (quoting Olson 
v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255, 54 S. Ct. 704, 78 L. Ed. 1236 (1934)). Id. at 2432. 
167 See, e.g., Brief of Sun-Maid Growers of California and the Raisin Bargaining Association Amici Curiae 
Brief in Support of Respondent (the U.S. Dep’t of Agriculture) No 14-275, at 12-13.  
168 As he states: “The question of just compensation was not presented in the Hornes’ petition for certiorari. 
It was barely touched on in the briefs. And the courts below did not decide it. At the same time, the case 
law that I have found indicates that the Government may well be right: The marketing order may afford just 
compensation for the takings of raisins that it imposes. If that is correct, then the reserve requirement does 
not violate the Takings Clause.” Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2433 (2015) (Breyer, J., 
concurring in part). 
169 This is similar to the concurrence of Froneman J in Agri South Africa, who felt that the new order rights 
were just and equitable compensation for the taking of the old older rights. See Agri South Africa, supra 
note 82, at para. 79. 
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taking to the value of the remaining (free-tonnage) 
raisins. More than a century ago, in Bauman v. Ross, 
167 U. S. 548 (1897), this Court established an 
exception to the rule that “just compensation normally 
is to be measured by ‘the market value of the property 
at the time of the taking.’” 
 . . . .  
In my view, . . . the relevant precedent indicates that the 
Takings Clause requires compensation in an amount 
equal to the value of the reserve raisins adjusted to 
account for the benefits received. And the Government 
does, indeed, suggest that the marketing order affords 
just compensation.170 
 
Of course if the program is not succeeding and the value added 
to the market price of raisins by the program does not offset the value 
of the raisins taken then, while there may be a taking, the just 
compensation would still not require the full market value of the 
raisins.171 Michael W. McConnell, in The Raisin Case, makes a strong 
argument that it is doubtful that the raisin reserves actually increased the 
price of raisins.172 Even if this is true, that does not mitigate against the 
need to remand to actually have the issue thoroughly vetted.  
It is worth noting that it is not clear that the program in Horne 
would amount to a taking in South Africa. Following the holding in 
Agri, SA, it is not clear that the government acquired the same or similar 
right that the Horne’s lost.173 The Raisen Committee, composed 
primarily of raisin growers, which takes title to the raisins does not get 
to do whatever it wishes with the raisins, but rather it is limited to 
disposing of the raisins in ways consistent with the purposes of the Act, 
for instance it “sells them in noncompetitive markets, . . . to exporters, 
federal agencies, or foreign governments; donates them to charitable 
causes; releases them to growers who agree to reduce their raisin 
production; or disposes of them by “any other means” consistent with 
the purposes of the raisin program.” 174 The proceeds are often used to 
                                                 
170 Id. 
171 What is also odd about the decision is that the government never actually physically took the raisins. If 
they did, then the question would be what are the value of the raisins they took? Again, since the government 
(and taxpayer) was arguably responsible for the added market value of the raisins, it would be unjust to ask 
the government (and the taxpayer) to pay the full market value.  
172 McConnell, supra note 159, at 328-31. He in fact criticizes justice Breyer for not being more skeptical 
of the government’s claims. Id. at 331. 
173 See supra note 84 (citing Agri South Africa v. Minister for Minerals and Energy 2013 4 SA 1 (CC) SA 
para. 58). 
174 Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2424 (2015) (citing 7 CFR § 989.67(b)(5) (2015)). 
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subsidize the export of raisins and as noted the individual growers retain 
an interest in any net proceeds from Raisin Committee sales.175 In fact, 
the Order “ensures that reserve raisins will be sold ‘at prices and in a 
manner intended to maxim[ize] producer returns.’”176 The federal 
government never actually physically took the raisins, but rather civilly 
fined the Hornes for not setting aside raisins for the government.  
Even if the program would be found to be an expropriation under 
South African law, the Court would have been required to factor in the 
benefits of the plan, as well as the government purpose of stabilizing 
and increasing the market price of raisins in determining what 
compensation would be fair and just. Again, the factors for determining 
just and equitable compensation in South Africa require that the Court 
consider “the extent of direct state investment and subsidy in the 
acquisition and beneficial capital improvement of the property; and the 
purpose of the expropriation.”177 
D.  Critiques of Regulatory Takings 
Not everyone has celebrated the Supreme Court expansion of 
regulatory takings,178 and in fact some have argued that the remedy is 
not supported by “any of the competing theories of constitutional 
interpretation” but in fact stems “from a misunderstanding of the 
Clause as guaranteeing a laissez-faire political economy.”179 As a 
judicially created doctrine that puts the weight of the Court behind 
individual property rights and against the power of political branches 
to enact land use laws and regulations for the common good, regulatory 
takings doctrine is arguably flawed from the perspective of political 
process.180 Andrew W. Schwartz argues that “Reliance instead on 
                                                 
175 Id. 
176 Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2449 (2015) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citing § 989.67(d)(1)). 
177 Section 25(3) d-e.  
178 See J. Peter Byrne, Ten Arguments for the Abolition of the Regulatory Takings Doctrine, 22 ECOLOGY 
L.Q. 89 (1995); Treanor, supra note 129. For praise of the Horne decision, see Brian T. Hodges and 
Christopher M. Kieseraa, Horne v. Department of Agriculture: The Takings Clause and the Administrative 
State, 16 ENGAGE: J. FEDERALIST SOC’Y PRAC. GROUPS 49 (2015); McConnell, supra note 159, at 314-15. 
179 Schwartz, supra note 151, at 248. It is somewhat curious that Oliver Wendell Holmes, who is famous, 
for among other things, stating that the Constitution does not embody Herbert Spencer’s social statistics, is 
the one responsible for writing the majority opinion in the case that started the doctrine of regulatory takings. 
Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). In 1905 Justice Holmes wrote in his dissent in Lochner 
v. New York (1905), “The Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer’s Social Statics . . .  
a constitution is not intended to embody a particular economic theory, whether of paternalism and the 
organic relation of the citizen to the State or of laissez faire.  It is made for people of fundamentally differing 
views, and the accident of our finding certain opinions natural and familiar or novel and even shocking 
ought not to conclude our judgment upon the question whether statutes embodying them conflict with the 
Constitution of the United States.” 
180 Treanor, supra note 129. Treanor argues that “The framers did not desire substantive protection of all 
property interests because, contrary to much legal scholarship, liberalism was not the dominant world view 
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decisions by the political branches of government would promote key 
values of the Constitution, protect the community’s interests in the 
environment, health, and safety, and result in greater overall fairness 
and efficiency.”181 Schwartz argues for the end of the doctrine of 
regulatory takings in somewhat apocalyptic terms, as he states: 
 
The Earth faces a stiff challenge in slowing 
environmental degradation: global warming, sea level 
rise, extreme weather, drought, loss of species, dying 
oceans and marine life, loss of arable soil, wildfires, 
groundwater contamination, air pollution, pandemics, 
congested cities, deforestation, and loss of open space. 
The United States suffers from a deficiency in affordable 
housing, homelessness, urban congestion, and dying 
cities . . . Drought and food shortages induced by climate 
change and contamination of air, water, and soils in 
poorer areas of the World have been, and will 
increasingly be, a catalyst for “global instability, hunger, 
poverty, and conflict.” While these environmental and 
social problems may not wipe out civilization on Earth, 
a consensus in the scientific community indicates that 
unless developed countries change their patterns of 
consumption of natural resources, degradation of the 
Earth’s natural systems may be unavoidable.182 
E.  State Law Developments in Regulatory Taking 
As noted, there were legislative responses by the states, both to 
the Kelo doctrine of taking for public purposes and the somewhat 
limited role of the Takings Clause in cases involving governmental 
regulation of property. While the former response gave property owners 
the remedy of limiting the government from being able to take property 
at all, the latter provides for the possibility of damages where none were 
available before. For the purposes of this paper, I will only address the 
latter response and the remedies provided under state law for regulatory 
takings. It should be noted at the outset, that this response was not nearly 
                                                 
at the time of the framing. Rather, republicanism continued to exert substantial influence on political 
discourse. Many of the framers believed that government could -- and in the interests of society often should 
-- limit individuals’ free use of their property; balancing societal needs against individual property rights 
was left in large part to the political process.” Id. at 783; See also Schwartz, supra note 151, at 248. 
181 Schwartz, supra note 151, at 247-49. 
182 Id. at 249-50. 
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as widespread as the response to the Kelo decision. Efforts at passing 
legislative changes were only successful in a handful of states, namely, 
Texas, Louisiana Mississippi, Florida, Oregon, and Arizona. 
  While the legislation in these states was largely designed to 
provide damages for the disproportionate impact of regulations on an 
individual’s property while leaving the regulation standing, the effect, 
in part, has been to discourage local and state land regulation efforts.183 
On the one hand, it is unfair for an individual property owner to 
carry a disproportionate burden for land use measures designed for the 
common good. On the other, this legislation has undermined the ability 
of state and local government to regulate for the common good and has 
also had the unfortunate consequence of reducing community input into 
land use decisions.184 
Because the remedy for compensation for physical takings was 
originally based on the idea that such takings were susceptible to process 
failure, Treanor argues that compensation for regulatory takings today 
should only be mandated when process failure is particularly likely 
“when there has been singling out or in environmental racism cases, 
where there has been discrimination against discrete and insular 
minorities . . . Except where process failure is likely, the decision about 
whether to compensate should be left to the political process.”185  
Unfortunately, some of this legislation is actually causing 
process failures, as opposed to providing a remedy when such failures 
occur.186 While there is often community input into land use regulations, 
there is not the same level of input into the waivers or variances often 
granted under this legislation.187 These laws might actually have a 
negative effect on the ability of low income neighborhoods to change 
land use zoning to get out from under exiting detrimental land use 
regimes, which are the product of failed political processes, including 
                                                 
183 John D. Echeverria & Thekla Hansen-Young, The Track Record on Takings Legislation: Lessons from 
Democracy's Laboratories, 28 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 439, 508 (2009) (stating “The Takings clauses in 
Florida and Oregon were supposed to generate financial awards for property owners without necessarily 
compromising the regulations themselves.  The reality in Florida and Oregon has been quite different, 
with state and local regulators waiving, repealing, or simply not adopting land use and environmental 
regulations essentially across the board . . . The deregulatory effect of takings measures is partly 
attributable to the large size of certain claims, the lack of dedicated funding mechanisms for paying 
claims, and the limited budgets of state and local governments.”). Id. at 501. The starkest example of this 
was the result of Oregon’s measure 37. There were over 7,000 claims and the government paid 
compensation in only one case. Id. at 489-90. All the other claims were settle with a waiver of the 
regulation. Id. at 487-89. 
184 Jacobs, Searching for Balance in the Aftermath of the 2006 Takings Initiatives, 116 YALE L.J. 1518, 1549 
(2007). 
185 Treanor, supra note 129, at 784. He goes so far as to argue that this should be the case even when there 
has been government seizure of property. Id. 
186 Id. at 513-16. 
187 Jacobs, supra note 184, at 1549. 
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environmental racism.188   
F.   State Legislation 
Six states currently have statutes that provide compensation for 
land use regulations that do not “take” property, but instead, merely 
diminish property values. Several more have legislation that requires 
land use regulation impact analysis.189  
Legislators in Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas all passed 
legislation granting landowners a remedy when land use regulations 
impact, but do not necessarily destroy, the fair market value of their 
property. Such laws risk opening up the floodgates of litigation since 
land use regulations often have an expansive and wide-ranging effect on 
the value of property, from removing all economic use of the property 
to a de minimis reduction in value. At the de minimis end of the 
spectrum, one could imagine a number of suits designed to thwart land 
use regulations rather than actually seeking damages for a loss in 
property value. These three states addressed the issue of de minimus 
claims and claims that may be designed to thwart regulations, rather 
than seek compensation, with significant thresholds.  Mississippi, in 
1999, was the first of three to pass this kind of legislation. The state 
enacted a relatively high threshold of a 40% reduction of fair market 
value for a landowner to bring this kind of statutory “takings” case.190 
Texas followed in 2000, with a lower threshold of 25%,191 and then 
Louisiana in 2005 with a threshold of merely 20%.192 As noted by Krier 
and Sterk, the Mississippi and Louisiana laws only apply to regulations 
that impact agricultural land and have not resulted in any published 
opinions.193 They further note that while the Texas law is broader and 
has resulted in a few opinions, those opinions have not been sympathetic 
                                                 
188 Id. at 1550-52. Since low income and minority neighborhoods carry a disproportionate burden of locally 
undesirable land uses, such as waste disposal sites, they need to be able to have a voice in future land use 
planning to rectify this. As noted by Jacobs, the literature firmly establishes this. See Jacobs, supra note 
184, at 1552; see, e.g., Vicky Been, Locally Undesirable Land Uses in Minority Neighborhoods: 
Disproportionate Siting or Market Dynamics?, 103 YALE L. J. 1384 (1994). 
189 See Steven J. Eagle, The Birth of the Property Rights Movement, POL’Y ANALYSIS, Dec. 15, 2005, at 1, 
26-27, http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa558.pdf (discussing takings impact assessment statutes in in 
Delaware, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Michigan, Montana, North Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, 
Washington, and West Virginia); see also JULIAN CONRAD JUERGENSMEYER & THOMAS E. ROBERTS, 
LAND USE PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT REGULATION LAW (2013) (stating that a dozen or so states 
require takings impact assessments.). 
190 MISS. CODE ANN. § 49-33-7(h) (1999). 
191 TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2007.002(5)(B)(ii) (Vernon 2000). 
192 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3:3602(11) (2005). 
193 Krier and Sterk, supra note 14, at 78.  
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to the landowners.194 In states like Florida,195 Oregon196 and most 
recently in Arizona,197 the legislation in question has no such threshold 
to bringing a claim.198  
Oregon’s first attempt at this type of legislation, Measure 37, 
which came into effect in 2004, caused considerable problems for the 
state.199 The legislation provided that: 
 
Owners of private real property are entitled to just 
compensation, equal to the reduction in the fair market 
value or modification or removal of the regulation, when 
a public entity enacts or enforces a new land use 
regulation or enforces a land use regulation enacted prior 
to December 2, 2004, that restricts the use of private real 
property . . . and has the effect of reducing the fair market 
value of the property.200  
 
Measure 37 also required that the landowner file a claim with the state 
and required the state to either settle the claim or waive the regulation 
within 180 days.  
Pursuant to this law, landowners filed approximately 7,000 
claims, worth around $17 billion, that the state was able to process 
within the 180-day time limit.201 Because the state was required to either 
waive the regulation in question or to pay compensation, and because 
the state had little time and less money to pay out the compensation, it 
met its deadline by waiving the regulations.202 Under Measure 37, there 
was only one case in which compensation was made to a claimant.203 
                                                 
194 Id. at text accompanying footnote 122. 
195 FLA. STAT. § 70.001(2012). 
196 OR. REV. STAT. § 197.352 (2015); id. § 195.305. 
197 Proposition 207 (Ariz. 2006) (ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 12-1131-1138), http:// 
www.azsos.gov/election/2006/General/BallotMeasureText/PROP%2020X%20(I-21-2006). 
198 According to Krier and Sterk, there has been no reported judgement requiring compensation under the 
Arizona statute, and the state may easily avoid liability based on a health and safety exception to the act. 
Krier and Sterk, supra note 14, at 80.     
199 As noted by John D. Echeverria & Thekla Hansen-Young, “Measure 37 also generated new land 
conflicts. Many neighbors of Measure 37 claimants filed lawsuits challenging the issuance of waivers by 
the state or local governments. In several instances, cities sued counties over their approval of Measure 37 
claims.201 The volume of controversy was even greater at the administrative level; neighboring landowners 
wrote over eighty-five thousand letters to the state registering objections or other comments on over two-
thirds of the claims filed with the state.” Echeverria & Hansen-Young, supra note 183, at 486. 
200 OR. REV. STAT. § 197.352 (2005). 
201 See Oregon Department of Land Conservation and Development, Ballot Measures 37 (2004) and 49 
(2007) Outcomes and Effects January 2011.  
202 Making Regulatory Takings Reform Work: The Lessons of Oregon’s Measure 37, 39 ENVTL. L. REP. 
10516, 10524, 10526, 10536 (2009). The authors similarly noted that “Landowners were routinely advised 
to reserve their Measure 37 rights by making a claim even if they had no actual plans of developing their 
land.”  
203 Id.  
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The result was the passing of Measure 49, which significantly limited 
the scope of the land use regulations that would be considered takings. 
The people of Oregon were not likely impressed by the fact that adult 
establishments were getting land use regulation waivers and so Measure 
49 excluded this type of regulation as well as others. Specifically 
Measure 49 provides in part that: 
 
This does not apply to land use regulations that were 
enacted prior to the claimant’s acquisition date or to land 
use regulations that: (a) Are public nuisances under 
common law; (b) Protect public health and safety; (c) 
Are required to comply with federal law; (d) That restrict 
or prohibit the use for the purpose of selling pornography 
or performing nude dancing; (e) Rezone land to an 
industrial zoning classification for inclusion within an 
urban growth boundary; or (f) Rezone urban growth 
boundary to industrial zoning classification.204  
 
Even with these changes, however, the Oregon legislation has 
had and will continue to have the effect of undermining the ability of 
residents to have input into decisions regarding the character of their 
neighborhoods.  While changes to neighboring properties generally 
required “public participation or proof that a land use change met a 
minimum standard, such as public welfare or unusual hardship” the new 
regime results in the waiver of regulations without any public input.205 
Like Oregon, Florida did not impose a minimum for bringing a 
statutory takings claim. Florida’s statute requires notice to neighboring 
landowners whenever one claim is submitted, and so there is potential 
for more community input than under the Oregon legislation.206 
However, the notified neighbor cannot make a claim under the Act if 
the notifying neighbor was granted relief under the Act and that relief 
impacted the notified neighbor’s property value.207 
When it was adopted in 1995, Florida’s law was the most far 
reaching legislation in the nation.208 Section 70.001, Florida Statutes 
                                                 
204 OR. REV. STAT. § 195.305 (2007). Other changes include a different mechanism for evaluating 
compensation, a limit on the number of dwelling places one could request to build, and it abolished claims 
that sought authority to develop new commercial or industrial uses. Echeverria & Hansen-Young, supra 
note 183, at 496. 
205 Jacobs, supra note 180, at 1549. “Neighbors have no legally defined opportunity to voice their concerns 
about the effect of zoning waivers on neighboring properties or the surrounding community.” 
206 Id. at 1549.  
207 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 70.001(3)(e) (West 2015). 
208 Echeverria & Hansen-Young, supra note 183, at 447. 
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(2012), provides in part: 
 
(1) [T]he Legislature herein provides for relief, or 
payment of compensation, when a new law, rule, 
regulation, or ordinance of the state or a political entity 
in the state, as applied, unfairly affects real property. 
(2) When a specific action of a governmental entity has 
inordinately burdened an existing use of real property or 
a vested right to a specific use of real property, the 
property owner of that real property is entitled to relief, 
which may include compensation for the actual loss to 
the fair market value of the real property caused by the 
action of government, as provided in this section. 
(3) For purposes of this section: 
. . . . 
(d) The term “action of a governmental entity” means a 
specific action of a governmental entity which affects 
real property, including action on an application or 
permit. 
(e) The terms “inordinate burden” and “inordinately 
burdened”: 
1. Mean that an action of one or more governmental 
entities has directly restricted or limited the use of real 
property such that the property owner is permanently 
unable to attain the reasonable, investment-backed 
expectation for the existing use of the real property or a 
vested right to a specific use of the real property with 
respect to the real property as a whole, or that the 
property owner is left with existing or vested uses that 
are unreasonable such that the property owner bears 
permanently a disproportionate share of a burden 
imposed for the good of the public, which in fairness 
should be borne by the public at large. 
 
On its face, the legislation is more limited than the Oregon 
legislation, which came after the Florida law, in that it limits claims to 
those effecting “existing use” and requires an “inordinate burden.” Also, 
unlike the Oregon statute it is not retroactive, does not apply to 
temporary limitations or moratoriums.209 Like Oregon’s Measure 49, it 
                                                 
209 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 70.001(3)(e) (West 2015). 
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provides exemption for efforts to abate nuisances.210 However, the term 
“existing use” is defined to include future uses that are reasonably 
foreseeable and are non-speculative.211 While the inordinate burden 
requirement does have a limiting effect, the inordinate burden 
requirement is a weak version of the Penn Central test in that it focuses 
on the part of the test most favorable to a claimant, namely the 
“reasonable investment-backed expectations” of the party.212 
Two cases in 2015 threatened to push the envelope further, 
resulting in the state legislature amending the Act:213 Smith v. City of 
Jacksonville,214 and FINR II, Inc. v. Hardee County.215 Both cases raised 
the question as to whether the Act is limited to regulations that apply 
directly to a given property or if the Act also applies to regulations of 
neighboring properties.216 On the one hand, one’s property value may 
be just as adversely impacted by a land use regulation on one’s 
neighbor’s property, as a land use regulation directed to one’s own 
property.217 On the other hand, the damage to property values of any 
land use regulation could extend indefinitely with no clear break in the 
legal causation chain of harm to property values.  
G.  The Smith Case 
In Smith, the Smiths purchased a parcel of undeveloped 
riverfront property in 2005, which was zoned “residential low density.” 
The undeveloped lot next door was owned by the City and was restricted 
to the leisure and recreation of Duval County employees.218 As the 
dissenting opinion of Makar notes, “The easterly lot had a luxury home 
with dock and landscaping; the westerly lot was zoned residential and 
had been restricted by deed—for fifty years—to be “used solely and 
only for the recreation and enjoyment of such employees of Duval 
                                                 
210 Id. 
211 Under the Act, a future use is an existing use if five conditions are met: the use (1) is “reasonably 
foreseeable,” (2) is “non-speculative,” (3) is “suitable for the subject real property,” (4) is “compatible with 
adjacent land uses,” and (5) creates “an existing fair market value in the property greater than the fair market 
value of the actual, present use or activity on the real property.” Id. § 70.001(3)(b). 
212 Krier and Sterk do not believe that the statute is more expansive than existing constitutional doctrine, 
and they note that “the few decided Florida cases have construed it narrowly.” Krier and Sterk, supra note 
14, at 79. While this is generally true, the FINR case threatened this interpretation prompting legislative 
reform. 
213 Laws 2015, c. 2015-142, § 1, eff. Oct. 1, 2015. 
214 Jacksonville v. Smith, 159 So.3d 888, 889 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015). 
215 164 So.3d 1260 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015). 
216 Jacksonville v. Smith, 159 So.3d 888, 889 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 2015). The Florida Supreme 
Court accepted review of the above decision on May 22, 2016. 
217 Or, as argued above, by a waiver of a land use regulation. 
218 Jacksonville v. Smith, 159 So.3d at 889. 
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County.”219 After the Smiths purchased the property, the City obtained 
a cancellation of the deed restriction, and in 2007, the City rezoned its 
property so that it could construct a fire station which was built between 
2010 and 2011.220  
The Smiths filed a complaint under the Bert Harris Act for 
$470,000 arguing that the construction of the fire station “inordinately 
burdened” [their] property because it effectively made the property 
unmarketable as a luxury home site.221 As the dissenting opinion of 
Makar describes it:  
 
The fire station, now in existence, is used to respond to 
general fire and rescue emergencies, as well as marine 
distress calls. It utilizes a commercial-level dock, which 
is used not only by two fire boats, but also port security 
and/or Florida Marine Patrol boats. The fire station 
property is now separated by the Smiths’ property by an 
eight-foot chain-link fence, which is immediately 
adjacent to the fire station’s parking lot. The dock, fence, 
and fire station height exceed the limits allowed by 
residential zoning. The fire station also has a balcony 
overlooking the Smiths’ property upon which fire 
fighters congregate. The parking lot is lighted 
throughout the night. There is a large generator placed 
near the Smiths’ property, and the building has speakers 
facing the property from which announcements are 
made. Claxons are also sounded when an emergency call 
is received at the fire station, and emergency vehicles 
may use sirens when departing from it. In short, the City 
has essentially created a light industrial use for its parcel, 
without notice to the Smiths.222  
 
The City argued that the Act did not apply because the City had not 
taken any action directly against the Smith property, but only the 
property next door. The trial court rejected the argument and directed 
that a jury be impaneled to determine the total amount of compensation 
due.223  
The City appealed and the Court of Appeals overturned the trial 
                                                 
219 Id. at 897 (Makar, J., dissenting). 
220 Id. 
221 Id. at 898. 
222 Id. at 899. 
223 Id. at 889-90. 
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court on the basis that the Smith’s property was not itself subject to any 
regulatory action.224 As the DCA noted, the trial court’s reading of the 
Act goes beyond the Act’s intended purpose and would open the 
floodgates of litigations.225 
In his partially dissenting opinion, Judge Swanson argued that, 
“The statutory phrase “directly restricted or limited the use of real 
property” is properly construed to refer to the issue of causation and 
simply requires the action of a governmental entity to immediately and 
detrimentally affect the value of real property without the intervention 
of other factors.” 
The dissent of Judge Makar argued that if the legislature 
intended the more limited application of the Act it could have used 
language similar to Texas, which explicitly limits the application of its 
Act to government action that “(i) affects an owner’s private real 
property that is the subject of the governmental action.”226   Makar 
further argued that the language requiring “direct impact” only applied 
to the first of two alternatives for making a claim.227 In other words, the 
definition of “inordinate burden” and “inordinately burdened” in section 
70.001(3)(e)(1) provides two alternative ways to show the inordinate 
burden: 
 
1. One is when the government has “directly restricted 
or limited the use of real property such that the 
property owner is permanently unable to attain the 
reasonable, investment-backed expectation for the 
existing use of the real property,” and the other 
separated by “or” is  
2. When a “vested right to a specific use of the real 
property with respect to the real property as a whole, 
or that the property owner is left with existing or 
vested uses that are unreasonable such that the 
property owner bears permanently a disproportionate 
share of a burden imposed for the good of the public, 
which in fairness should be borne by the public at 
large.”228 
 
                                                 
224 Id. at 888-89. 
225 Id. at 894. The majority opinion relied on the text and the State Attorney General opinion that the intent 
of the legislation was to require direct application of a regulation to the property in question before the Act 
applied. AGO Fla. 95-78 (1995). 
226 Id. at 906 (Makar, J., dissenting). 
227 Id. 
228 Id. at 907 (Makar, J., dissenting). 
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The second option does not include language requiring a 
“direct” restriction or limit and thus, since the Smiths’ claim satisfy the 
requirement that they were “left with existing or vested uses that are 
unreasonable such that the [they] bear[] permanently a disproportionate 
share of a burden imposed for the good of the public, which in fairness 
should be borne by the public at large, there was a taking under the 
act.229 
H.  The FINR Case 
In the Second District Court of Appeal case, the reasoning of the 
dissenting opinions of Judges Makar and Swanson from the Smith case 
won the day. Here, the facts were even more stark. The Florida Institute 
for Neurological Rehabilitation (FINR) brought its Harris Act claim 
after Hardee County Florida approved a special exception for CF 
Industries, Inc., to operate a phosphate mine within 150 to 207 feet from 
FINR’s property, rather than the quarter mile under existing county 
codes and plans.230 FINR claimed that the noise, vibrations and dust 
made it virtually impossible to operate a brain treatment and vocational 
service facility for veterans and survivors of brain injuries with a 
resulting decrease in the land’s fair market value of $38,000,000.231 This 
was due to the fact that the exception reduced the use of the land to 
“merely agricultural and recreational land.”232 
The Second District Court of Appeal rejected the reasoning in 
Smith, holding that the owner of the property adjacent to the property 
that was subject to Hardee County’s governmental action, can maintain 
a cause of action under the Bert Harris Act.233 As the court held: 
 
To limit the Act to afford a cause of action only to a 
property owner whose property was subject to the direct 
action of a governmental entity would be to rewrite the 
statute to insert an additional requirement not placed 
there by the legislature and would defeat the legislature’s 
stated intent . . . section 70.001(2) contains no 
requirement that the regulation giving rise to the 
inordinate burden directly affect the burdened property. 
The Act establishes broad protection for property owners 
                                                 
229 Judge Makar notes that this was the basis for the decision below.  
230 FINR II, Inc. v. Hardee County, 164 So.3d 1261-62 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015). 
231 Id. at 1262. 
232 Id. 
233 Id. at 1263. It then certified a conflict with Jacksonville v. Smith, 159 So.3d 888 (Fla. 2015).  
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who suffer economic loss from governmental property 
regulations and actions.234 
 
The court expressly endorsed Makar J’s argument that “if the 
Florida legislature had intended to enact a more narrow meaning of 
governmental action . . . they could have easily done so.”235 As well as 
Judge Swanson’s argument that ‘directly restricted or limited the use of 
real property’ is an issue of causation, simply requiring that “the action 
of a governmental entity . . . immediately and detrimentally affect the 
value of real property without the intervention of other factors.”236 The 
Court debunked the claim by the Smith majority that this would “open 
a floodgate of litigation, [and] create a ‘cataclysmic change in the law 
of regulatory takings.’”237 As the Court stated, “There is no language in 
the Act that would allow for its application to property that was only 
incidentally or remotely affected as a result of government action, and 
we do not read it to provide relief to those property owners who are so 
far removed from the action that the government could not reasonably 
anticipate their harm.”238  
Finally, the Court noted that should the Smith majority would 
allow for the government to disregard vested rights and legitimate 
interests of adjacent landowners for all sorts of land uses that could 
impact one’s property value, e.g. “jails, landfills, airports, waste 
incinerators, sewage treatment plants, power plants . . . [as well as] 
excavation, blasting, and mining in areas previously protected from 
such intrusions.”239 
I.    The Legislative Response 
Despite the logic and assurances, the Florida Legislature, 
anticipating a flood of litigation, immediately passed a bill amending 
the Harris Act which was promptly signed into law by the governor.240 
The relevant amendments changed the definition of “property owner” 
in section 70.001(3)(f) so as to limit the protection of the act to those 
who “hold[] legal title to the real property that is the subject of and 
directly impacted by the action of a governmental entity.” The 
amendment also changed the definition of “real property” in subsection 
                                                 
234 Id. at 1264. 
235 Id. at 1265. 
236 Id.  
237 Id. at 1266. 
238 Id. (citing with approval Judge Makar’s dissenting opinion at 908 n.26.). 
239 Id. (citing with approval Judge Swanson’s dissent at 896). 
240 Laws 2015, c. 2015-142, § 1, eff. Oct. 1, 2015. 
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(g) to clarify that it only includes, “parcels that are the subject of and 
directly impacted by the action of a governmental entity.”241  
J.   Concluding Remarks 
The Smith case is currently in front of the Florida Supreme 
Court and so it is hard to say whether the court will be sympathetic to 
the plight of the Smiths or the reasoning of the majority in the Smith 
case.  Given the legislative change, there no longer any grounds to fear 
a flood of litigation. Of course, for cases brought before the amendment 
like Smith and FINR, the Court could limit its decision to the facts of 
Smith, given that Smith is the adjoining neighbor and at least in this 
context, clearly the most adversely impacted property in the 
neighborhood.  
Critics of the Oregon and Florida legislation argue that the laws 
eviscerate regulatory authority,242 undermine local democracy,243 
benefits special interests, e.g. the timber industry in Oregon and huge 
landowners like the U.S. Sugar corporation, the St. Joe Paper company, 
and other large developers in Florida,244 works to the detriment of 
average homeowners245 and lower income and minority communities.246 
As the authors of Land Use Planning and Development Regulation 
Law,247 point out, “[a]n arguable deficiency with these efforts to treat 
property owners more fairly is the notable omission of any effort to 
recapture for the public the windfall gains conferred on landowners by 
virtue of public improvements and government regulation.”248  
 While there were a few articles written in support of this 
legislation shortly after it was passed, there has been no defense since 
which evaluates the laws impacts, or which puts them in a positive 
light.249 While Krier and Sterk argue that this law and other similar 
legislative reforms (outside of Oregon) have had little impact, their 
empirical analysis is based strictly on decided cases and says little about 
                                                 
241 Id. 
242 Echeverria & Hansen-Young, supra note 183, at 499. See, e.g., Florida’s Private Property Rights 
Protection Act: Does It Inordinately Burden the Public Interest?, 48 U. FLA. L. REV. 695 (1996) and Sylvia 
R. Lazos, Florida’s Property Rights Act: A Political Quick Fix Results in a Mixed Bag of Tricks, 23 FLA. 
ST. UNIV. L. REV. 315 (1995). 
243 Echeverria & Hansen-Young, supra note 179, at 513. 
244 Id. at 504-05. 
245 Id. at 505. 
246 See id.; see also Jacobs, supra note 184, at 1550-54. 
247 Julian Conrad Juergensmeyera & Thomas E. Roberts, LAND USE PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT 
REGULATION LAW § 10:11 (3d ed. 2016). 
248 Id. 
249 For a complimentary article, see Powell, Rhodes, & Stengle, A Measured Step to Protect Private Property 
Rights, 23 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 255, 296 (1995) (authors were drafters of the bill).  
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the chilling effect of such legislation on municipal land use and 
regulation generally.250 There may be less case law, and less cases won 
by property owners and developers, because there is less regulation and 
the regulations passed may be more cautious, if not more reasonable. 
Finally, there may be less case law because municipalities are settling 
or giving into the demands of developers and property owners. 
IV.      CONCLUSION 
As detailed above, the United States and South Africa stand in 
sharp contrast to each other in how they balance the power of the state 
to regulate for the common good and individual property rights. States 
like Florida are pushing the envelope to the extreme of protecting 
individual property owners to the potential detriment of the people as a 
whole, while recent legislation in South Africa has the potential of over-
correcting for the wrongs of the past through uncompensated takings 
under the guise of state guardianship. While it is too early to know how 
this recent legislation in South Africa will play out, the deleterious 
effects of the legislation in Florida and in Oregon is relatively well 
established. There is a need in both countries for a balanced approach, 
and each has arguably gone too far in opposite directions. 
 
 
                                                 
250 In fairness, Krier and Sterk noted that municipalities may be litigation averse and thus prone to making 
concessions to litigious developers. Krier and Sterk, supra note 14, at n.65. They cite with approval Serkin, 
Big Differences for Small Governments: Local Governments and the Takings Clause, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1624, 1680 (2006) (noting that the risk aversion of local governments with respect to taking claims may 
reduce the incidence of regulation). They do not, however, acknowledge that legislation like the Florida 
Harris Act may result in less case law, merely by virtue of the chilling effect of such laws on local 
regulations.  
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